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I. INTRODUCTION
The headlines abound: "Senior Officials Indicted," "CFO
Pleads Guilty," "Employee Blows Whistle on Fraudulent
Accounting Practices." It is difficult to pick up a newspaper
today without reading of corporate scandal. From the
spectacular financial debacles of Enron, WorldCom, and
ImClone,1 to Guidant Corporation's tragic failure to remove a
defective medical device from the market,2 corporate
misconduct appears ubiquitous. As a result of growing
public demand for accountability, a wave of criminal
prosecutions and civil enforcement proceedings is surging
1 See, e.g., Understanding Enron, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2002, at A2;
Kurt Eichenwald, Andersen Guilty in Effort to Block Inquiry on Enron,
N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2002, § 1, at 1.
2 See David S. Hilzenrath, Firm Silent as Patients Died; Device Maker
Pleads Guilty to Misleading FDA, WASH. POST, June 13, 2003, at Al;
Deadly Devices, WASH. POST, June 18, 2003, at A24 (editorial criticizing
$92 million in fines and requirement for implementation of corporate
integrity measures as inadequate punishment for Guidant Corp.'s failure
to report serious problems, including a number of deaths, allegedly caused
by a device it manufactured and marketed to treat abdominal aortic
aneurysms).
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forward against business enterprises and their managers.
The passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act'-including
provisions directing the Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC") to promulgate rules requiring attorney
disclosure of corporate misconduct'-ensures that this tide
will continue to rise.
At some point, almost every organization encounters
troubling questions of real or suspected wrongdoing by
officers, directors, or employees. Sometimes there are few, if
any, repercussions. On occasion, however, unfolding events
reveal a pattern of wrongdoing so pervasive that it destroys
the organization itself and leaves many of its principals
3 President George W. Bush appointed the Corporate Fraud Task
Force in the summer of 2002. According to Attorney General John
Ashcroft, the work of the Task Force during its first six months resulted in
the initiation of more than 150 investigations by the United States
Department of Justice ("DOJ"), the filing of criminal charges against 200
individuals, and the entry of sixty guilty pleas in federal criminal
proceedings. Attorney General John Ashcroft, Remarks at United States
Department of Justice Press Conference (Feb. 25, 2003) (announcing
indictment of former Qwest officials) (transcript available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/2003/022503qwestpressconference.htm).
This groundswell in criminal prosecutions of business organizations builds
on momentum gathered in the 1990s. "In recent years, corporations and
business organizations have been frequent targets of criminal
investigations at both the state and federal levels .... The 1990s may well
be remembered as the decade when traditional business practices came to
be viewed with suspicion by law enforcement agencies." Benedict P.
Kuehne, Protecting the Privilege in the Corporate Setting: Conducting and
Defending Internal Corporate Investigations, 9 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 651,
652 (1997). Trends in criminal prosecutions and civil enforcement
proceedings against corporations are discussed more fully infra Part II.B.
' Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (to be
codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.) See
Department of Justice Field Guidance on New Criminal Authorities
Enacted in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (H.R. 3763) Concerning
Corporate Fraud and Accountability (Aug. 1, 2002) (providing both a
summary of key provisions and useful insights on the DOJ's view of the
nature and prospective application of the criminal provisions of the act), at
http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/readingroom/saroxl.htm; see also infra notes 74-
86.
' Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 307, 15 U.S.C.A. § 7245 (West 2003).
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facing criminal prosecution.6 In an effort to help clients
discover and deal with potentially serious misconduct,
lawyers representing corporations routinely advise their
clients to conduct internal investigations of suspected
wrongdoing.7 Prosecutors and government agencies have
encouraged this trend,8 and the highly publicized inquiries
conducted by counsel retained by the boards of Enron,
WorldCom and other major corporations9 have made the
term "internal investigation" common parlance.
Consequently, the internal investigation has become a
hallmark of corporate legal practice. 10
6 See, e.g., Press Release, United States Department of Justice, Former
Enron Chief Financial Officer Andrew S. Fastow Charged with Fraud,
Money Laundering, Conspiracy (Oct. 2, 2002), at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/
pr/2002/October/02_crm_568.htm; Former Enron Exec Pleads Guilty,
Agrees to Pay $12 Million, 16 No. 10 WHITE-COLLAR CRIME REP. 1 (2002).
' Organizations undertake internal investigations in a wide variety of
circumstances-e.g., determining the validity of allegations of criminal
misconduct before government agents come to the door armed with search
warrants; assessing the risks posed by an ongoing government
investigation; dealing with potential environmental law infractions in time
to avoid actual harm; or investigating an employee's claims of harassment
prior to the institution of costly and disruptive litigation.
8 See infra text accompanying notes 38-43 & 173-85.
See, e.g., Report of Investigation by the Special Investigative
Committee of the Board of Directors of Enron Corp. (Feb. 1, 2002), at
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/enron/sicreport; Christopher Stern,
U.S. Seeks Delay in Publication of WorldCom Report, WASH. POST, Mar.
13, 2003, at E02.
'0 Undertaking an internal investigation is not without significant
risk, however. While investigation of specific allegations of misconduct or
areas of known vulnerability paves the way for resolution of these
problems, investigators may also uncover other potentially troubling
situations that the corporation is not prepared to deal with immediately,
or even provide a road map for subsequent probes by government agents.
See, e.g., Gabriel L. Imperato, Internal Investigations, Government
Investigations, Whistleblower Concerns: Techniques to Protect Your
Healthcare Organization, 51 ALA. L. REV. 205, 211 (1999); Joseph T.
McLaughlin & J. Kevin McCarthy, Corporate Internal Investigations-
Legal Privileges and Ethical Issues in the Employment Law Context, in
CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN EMPLOYMENT LAw 1998, at 991, 993 (Am. Law
Inst.-Am. Bar Ass'n Course of Study, No. SD06, 1998).
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An internal investigation is an inquiry conducted by, or
on behalf of, an organization in an effort to discover salient
facts pertaining to acts or omissions that may generate civil
or criminal liability. Internal investigations are invaluable
tools for addressing a wide variety of potential sources of
corporate civil and criminal liability.11  The employee
interview is the heart of the internal investigation.12
Documents, accounting ledgers, and other corporate records
are important, but words and numbers come to life through
the stories related by real people. Talking with those who
have knowledge of key developments facilitates
understanding of what happened and why better than any
other investigative tool.
For many employees, participation in an internal
investigative interview is simply one more work obligation.
For others, the investigative interview may lead to
discipline, dismissal, or even criminal charges. In the
current law enforcement environment, there is a significant
possibility that information provided by corporate
constituents in the course of internal investigative
interviews will be disclosed to prosecutors or other
government agents. United States Department of Justice
("DOJ") policy encourages prosecutors to seek disclosure of
the fruits of corporate internal investigations before deciding
whether to file criminal charges against corporate
defendants, enter into plea negotiations, or take positions
with respect to sentencing. 3  "Voluntary" corporate
disclosures often include material such as a lawyer's notes of
employee interviews and communications with counsel that
otherwise would be shielded by the corporation's attorney-
client and work-product privileges. 4 At a time when the
number of corporate prosecutions is rapidly increasing and
" See supra note 7.
-12 See, e.g., Kuehne, supra note 3, at 679-80 ("Interviews bring color to
otherwise bland and sometimes boring documents."); Randall J. Turk, The
Interview Process, in INTERNAL CORPORATE INVESTIGATIONS 89, 90 (Brad D.
Brian et al. eds., 2d ed. 2002).
"See infra text accompanying notes 186-210.
'4 See infra text accompanying notes 135-69.
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more than ninety percent of organizations charged with
violating federal criminal laws plead guilty,15 attorneys
conducting internal investigations may well be gathering
information likely to end up in the hands of the government.
Yet, even sophisticated employees often fail to appreciate
that corporate counsel may metamorphose into de facto
government agents.
As a result of these circumstances, lawyers who conduct
internal investigative interviews constantly confront the
inherent tension between zealous representation of their
corporate clients and fairness to corporate constituents. This
tension gives rise to significant ethical issues for lawyers
handling internal investigations for corporate clients, as well
as for prosecutors who later seek to obtain the information
these investigations uncover. For corporate counsel these
dilemmas include: when and how to disclose to an
interviewee that counsel represents the business entity, not
the individual; what to say in response to questions such as
"Do I need my own lawyer?"; and what to advise corporate
clients with respect to government demands for privilege
waivers, constituent requests for advancement of attorneys'
fees, and related issues.
Ethical dilemmas also arise with respect to the conduct of
prosecuting attorneys. A number of defense attorneys have
raised concerns about federal government policies that
effectively condition favorable treatment of corporate
defendants on waiver of the attorney-client and work-
product privileges and often encourage corporations to refuse
continued employment, advancement of legal fees, and other
support to their constituents.16 The rules of professional
responsibility in most jurisdictions address the questions
raised by internal investigations and related questions only
to a limited, and rarely adequate, extent.
1 See Kevin J. Cloherty et al., 10 Years of the Organizational
Sentencing Guidelines: The Time Is Right for Review, 16 No. 4 WHITE-
COLLAR CRIME REP. 1 (2002) ("[N]early all cases involving corporate
criminal defendants are resolved with guilty pleas.... ."); infra text
accompanying notes 174-75.
16 See infra text accompanying notes 186-210.
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During the last two years, both lawmakers and members
of the legal profession have lavished attention on putting in
place mechanisms to hold corporate actors accountable and
to uncover corporate misconduct. Like Sarbanes-Oxley, the
amendments to the American Bar Association Model Rules of
Professional Conduct ("Model Rules") adopted by the House
of Delegates of the American Bar Association ("ABA") in
August of 200317 focus on attorney disclosure of corporate
misconduct. 18 Like the earlier version, the amended Model
Rules offer only limited guidance to corporate law
practitioners about when and how to disclose the purpose
and possible consequences of employee interviews to
participants.
Ethical issues pertaining to internal investigations affect
the lives and careers of corporate constituents ranging from
line employees to chief executive officers. They also directly
impact public perception of lawyers at a time when lawyers
are already subject to widespread criticism that calls into
question the integrity of the legal profession and exacts a toll
on practitioners.' 9 Consequently, it is imperative for the
legal profession to address situations that threaten both
public and personal perceptions of professional integrity.
"7 See Press Release, American Bar Association, ABA Adopts New
Lawyer Ethics Rules, Urges Fairness in Military Commission Trials (Aug.
12, 2003), at http://www.abanet.org/media/aug03/081203_l.html. The
relevant resolutions are available at http://www.abanet.org/leadership/
2003/journal/119b.pdf (last visited Oct. 22, 2003). The text of the amended
rules is available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/new-rulel-6.pdf (last
visited Oct. 22, 2003) and http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/new-rule
1-13.pdf (last visited Oct. 22, 2003).
18 See id.
'9 One commentator suggests that the "foremost factor underlying the
trend toward naming lawyers as defendants in lawsuits appears to be the
failure of the professional responsibility guidelines to address problems of
modern corporate law practice." George D. Reycraft, Conflicts of Interest
and Effective Representation: The Dilemma of Corporate Counsel, 39
HASTINGS L.J. 605, 607-08 (1988). Reycraft also observes, "Today, law
firms are perceived to be more like businesses. As a result, the courts are
beginning to treat law firms like other businesses and eliminating the




This article addresses key ethical issues pertaining to the
conduct of employee interviews in the course of internal
corporate investigations. The discussion focuses on business
corporations, but it is equally applicable to other for-profit
and not-for-profit organizations." Part II provides
background information on developments in organizational
criminal liability over the past two decades, the importance
of the United States Sentencing Commission's
Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, and the concomitant
emergence of the internal investigation as an integral part of
modern corporate legal practice. Part III examines law
enforcement authorities' growing insistence on corporate
"cooperation" as a prerequisite to participation in voluntary
disclosure programs, avoidance of prosecution, and
negotiation of guilty pleas. The principal rules of
professional responsibility applicable to employee interviews,
including changes in the Model Rules recently adopted by
the ABA in the wake of Sarbanes-Oxley and the new SEC
attorney conduct rules,2' are discussed in Part IV. Part V
looks at difficulties inherent in the application of current
professional responsibility standards in the context of
investigative employee interviews, and Part VI offers
proposed principles for revision of standards applicable to
20 National attention has focused principally on business corporations,
but other entities have proved far from immune from the focus on
institutions. Law partnerships, philanthropic organizations, and even
universities have felt the sting of penalties under the Civil False Claims
Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (2000), and other federal and state statutes.
See, e.g., M. William Salaganik, Johns Hopkins Settles False Billings Case,
BALT. SUN, Feb. 15, 2003, at 10C. For the most part, similar kinds of
considerations apply to any entity confronted with criminal or civil
wrongdoing where that entity has a separate legal existence as an
"artificial" or "juristic" person. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
1.13 cmt. 1 (2003). These organizations include not-for-profit corporations,
limited liability corporations, and in most states, limited partnerships,
general partnerships, and a number of emerging forms of unincorporated
business associations. See CTR. FOR PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, AM. BAR ASS'N,
ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 221-22 (5th ed.
2003).
21 See infra note 86.
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internal investigative interviews and related prosecutorial
demands for corporate cooperation with law enforcement
authorities. These basic principles are designed to promote
both fairness to employees and professional integrity amid
the rush to expose and prosecute corporate misconduct.
II. THE EMERGENCE OF THE INTERNAL
INVESTIGATION IN RESPONSE TO EXPANSION OF
CIVIL AND CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS AGAINST
CORPORATE DEFENDANTS
The DOJ currently espouses the view that "certain crimes
that carry with them a substantial risk of great public
harm... are by their nature most likely to be committed by
businesses, and there may, therefore, be a substantial
federal interest in indicting the corporation."22 Prior to the
1960s, however, criminal prosecution of major corporations
and other entities was unusual;23 even civil enforcement
22 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, Federal Prosecution of Business
Organizations, in CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL No. 162 (2003), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia-reading-room/usam/title9/crmOO162.
htm (as amended by Memorandum from Deputy Attorney General Larry
D. Thompson to Heads of Department Components, United States
Attorneys on Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations
(Jan. 20, 2003), at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/readingroom/saroxl.htm (last
visited Oct. 22, 2003)).
23 For a discussion of the bases of corporate criminal liability, see
KATHLEEN F. BRICKEY, CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY (2d ed. 1992 &
Supp. 2002); RICHARD STEPHEN GRUNER, CORPORATE CRIME AND
SENTENCING §§ 2.1-.6, 3.1-.9 (1994 & Supp. 1995). The most commonly
offered theory of liability is based on the tort concept of respondeat
superior. As the United States Attorney's Manual instructs:
Corporations are "legal persons," capable of suing and
being sued, and of committing crimes. Under the doctrine
of respondeat superior, a corporation may be held
criminally liable for the illegal acts of its directors, officers,
employees, and agents. To hold a corporation liable for
these actions, the government must establish that the
corporate agent's actions (i) were within the scope of his
duties, and (ii) were intended, at least in part, to benefit
the corporation. In all cases involving wrongdoing by
corporate agents, prosecutors should consider the
[Vol. 2003
proceedings rarely resulted in the severe penalties common
today.24  During the last two decades, however, both
corporation, as well as the responsible individuals, as
potential criminal targets.
Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations, supra note 22, pt. I.
See also, e.g., Sean Bajkowski & Kimberly R. Thompson, Corporate
Criminal Liability, 34 AM. CRIM L. REV. 445, 446 n.5, 448 (1997);
19 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE
LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 5.10 (perm. ed., rev. vol. 2002);
GRUNER, supra, §§ 3.31-.33; Molly E. Joseph, Organizational
Sentencing, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1017, 1018-19 (1998). There is
also an emerging notion that artificial persons, like natural
persons, must control themselves in a manner that comports with
civilized society and the behavioral rules by which it is governed.
See Cloherty et al., supra note 15, at text preceding note 5. As
Gruner points out, "[c]orporate criminal liability ties the interests
of the public in lawful corporate conduct to the financial well-being
of each firm." GRUNER, supra, § 1.1. Subjecting corporations to
criminal liability is an effective public policy tool, because the
possibility of criminal sanctions
forces corporate managers to pay attention to law
compliance amidst economic forces and the crush of other
affairs that might otherwise cause them to ignore
compliance defects in corporate operations. Even if
corporate managers have not caused these defects,
corporate criminal liability insures that these managers
have reasons to exert themselves to recognize illegal
defects in corporate conduct and to react with preventive
improvements in corporate operations.
Id.
24 The Supreme Court first upheld the criminal prosecution of a
corporation under the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2000) in 1909 in
New York Cent. & Hudson R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 494-95
(1909). 10 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE
LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 4942 n.18 (perm. ed., rev. vol. 2002). In
1890, violations of the Sherman Act constituted misdemeanors punishable
by a fine of up to $5000. Congress increased the monetary penalty to
$50,000 in 1955, and provided for felony prosecution of specific categories
of violations in 1974. In 1974, Congress also amended federal securities
laws to make specified violations into felonies. Id. Subsequent
amendments increased penalties for convicted corporations in a number of
areas. See, e.g., Criminal Fines Improvement Act of 1987 § 6, Pub. L. No.
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significant civil enforcement proceedings and criminal
prosecutions of companies and individual officers, directors
and employees have become commonplace. In the 1960s, the
SEC led the way in the civil enforcement arena with its
pursuit of significant civil sanctions against violators of the
federal securities laws.25  Other federal agencies soon
followed the SEC's lead.26 By the mid 1970s, Congress, too,
joined in by legislatively increasing the sanctions for a
number of criminal and civil offenses applicable to corporate
entities and their officers, directors and employees.27
In the early 1980s, federal prosecutors became
increasingly interested in corporate misconduct, and federal
agencies began to move in the direction of prosecuting both
entities and their constituents as a means of holding
corporate decision makers accountable.2" As the stakes rose,
more corporations began to initiate internal investigations of
potential legal problems in an effort to identify and address
100-185, 101 Stat. 1279, 1280 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §
3571(c)(5) (2000)). In Sarbanes-Oxley, Congress increased penalties for
violations of a number of federal laws, Sarbanes-Oxley Act, supra note 4,
§§ 805, 901-904, and directed the United States Sentencing Commission
("USSC") to review the guidelines for sentencing pursuant to these
statutes. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, supra note 4, §§ 805, 905, 1104. Pursuant
to Sarbanes-Oxley and its general authority under 28 U.S.C. § 994 (2000),
the USSC promulgated temporary emergency amendments to the
sentencing guidelines earlier this year. The text of these amendments is
available at http://www.ussc.gov/FEDREG/fedr0103b.htm (last visited Oct.
20, 2003).
" See, e.g., Arthur F. Mathews, Internal Corporate Investigations, 45
OHIO STATE L.J. 655, 655-56 (1984).
26 See BRICKEY, supra note 23, § 1:01; STEPHEN F. BLACK, INTERNAL
CORPORATE INVESTIGATIONS § 1.01, at 1-1 (1998).
27 See BRICKEY, supra note 23, § 1:02.
28 Id. For example, in 1981, the DOJ created the Environmental
Enforcement Section as a branch of the Natural Resources Division, and
the United States Environmental Protection Agency established an Office
of Criminal Enforcement. Id.; see also Nancy K. Kubasek et al., The Role
of Criminal Enforcement in Attaining Environmental Compliance in the
United States and Abroad, 7 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 122, 122-23 (2000).
[Vol. 2003
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issues before they became the focus of government
inquiries.
29
A. The Development of the Internal Investigation as a
Defensive Tool
During this same time period, the concept of corporate
responsibility for individual misconduct that benefited the
organization began to crystallize." For many years,
corporate managers had little reason to fear criminal or civil
sanctions for either themselves or the entities they
managed." In the 1970s, however, the SEC aggressively
pursued civil enforcement proceedings against corporations
involved in making questionable payments to foreign
officials, and law enforcement authorities began to scrutinize
the conduct of corporations and their managers to a greater
extent than ever before. The SEC, in particular, sought to
put in place measures to permit thorough investigation of
corporate activities in a variety of areas.2 For example, in
negotiating consent decrees, the SEC began to seek new
29 In some instances prosecutors have moved aggressively against
lawyers representing corporations, as well as the entities and their
constituents. See generally Corey D. Babington, Note, Preserving the
Attorney-Client Privilege After United States v. Anderson, 49 U. KAN. L.
REV. 221 (2000); Joel Cohen & Norman Bloch, Can Lawyers Be Prosecuted
for the Advice They Give?, 206 N.Y. L.J. 1 (1991); Stuart M. Gerson &
Jennifer E. Gladieux, Advice of Counsel: Eroding Confidentiality in
Federal Health Care Law, 51 ALA. L. REV. 163, 195 (1999).
31 See generally BRICKEY, supra note 23, § 4.02.
" For example, prior to the early 1980s, "corporate officers and
managers [were not] concerned about going to jail" for violation of federal
environmental laws. Kubasek et al., supra note 28, at 123.
32 See, e.g., BLACK, supra note 26, at 1-1. For a summary of
developments with respect to SEC enforcement actions pertaining to
insider trading, political slush funds, foreign payments and executive
perquisites, see Promotion of the Reliability of Financial Information and
Prevention of the Concealment of Questionable or Illegal Corporate
Payments and Practices, Exchange Act Release No. 15,570, 44 Fed. Reg.
10970 (Feb. 15, 1979) and see also, Mathews, supra note 25, at 662-65.
No. 3:859]
kinds of remedies for corporate securities law violations. 3
These measures included provisions for the addition of new,
independent corporate directors charged with pursuing
"internal corporate special investigations, "' 34 engagement of
special counsel and auditors to review and report on
particular businesses and practices," and court-supervised
appointment of independent counsel to conduct
investigations.3 6 In several instances, the DOJ's Office of the
Special Prosecutor also initiated criminal charges against
corporations and senior executives." By the height of the
Watergate Era in the mid 1970s, it became apparent that, in
addition to the foreign payment morass, senior managers of
many major corporations were entangled in a web of illegal
political campaign contributions in the United States. 8
Recognizing that its own resources were limited and
concluding that "in most cases the public interest could be
served adequately by disclosure and cessation of the
derelictions, without additional sanctions against the
reporting company or its employees,"39 the SEC began to
encourage corporations to conduct their own investigations
into. questionable foreign payments, illegal campaign
13 See generally Mathews, supra note 25, at 656-57; George W. Dent,
Jr., Ancillary Remedies in Federal Securities Law: A Study in Federal
Remedies, 67 MINN. L. REV. 865 (1983); James R. Farrand, Ancillary
Remedies in SEC Civil Enforcement Suits, 89 HARv. L. REV. 1779 (1976);
Comment, Equitable Remedies in SEC Enforcement Actions, 123 U. PA. L.
REV. 1188 (1975). For a review of current remedy provisions, see LouIs
Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 3D ch. 13 (2001).
34 Mathews, supra note 25, at 658-63.
35 Id. at 660-62.
36 Id. at 662.
" The International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998:
Hearing on H.R. 4353 Before the House Subcommittee on Finance and
Hazardous Materials, Committee on Commerce, 105th Cong. 2-3 (1998)
(statement of Paul V. Gerlach, Associate Director, Division of
Enforcement, Securities and Exchange Comm'n) [hereinafter Gerlach
Testimony].
8 BLACK, supra note 26, at A-i; Mathews, supra note 25, at 662-64.
39 BLACK, supra note 26, at 1-1.
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contributions, and other corporate misconduct.40 The agency
offered leniency to companies that came forward to report
infractions.4' The SEC soon formalized a voluntary
disclosure program that relied to a large extent on
corporations' willingness to undertake internal
investigations. 42 During the 1970s, more than four hundred
United States corporations, including one hundred seventeen
Fortune 500 companies, participated in the SEC's voluntary
disclosure program. 3
The SEC's actions, Internal Revenue Service ("IRS")
investigations of improper business deductions for illegal
foreign payments and domestic contributions,44 the passage
of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in 1977, 6  and the
mushrooming political fall-out of the Watergate scandal,46
caused federal law enforcement authorities to delve into
realms of activities once perceived solely as internal
corporate affairs. As the scope of government inquiry into
business conduct continued to expand, a number of American
companies initiated internal investigations on their own in
the hope of uncovering problems and staving off prosecution
40 See Mathews, supra note 25, at 662-65.
41 BLACK, supra note 26, at 1-2.
42 Mathews, supra note 25, at 666-71.
4 Gerlach Testimony, supra note 37, at 3.
BLACK, supra note 26, at 1-1.
Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 78(m)(b)(2)-(3), 78dd-1-2 (2000)). In addition, the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968
(2000), while originally enacted to address problems posed by organized
crime, became another tool used by prosecutors against otherwise ordinary
corporations and their officers and directors. See, e.g., FLETCHER ET AL.,
supra note 23, § 5.12.
46 The Watergate scandal had a profound impact on perceptions of
corporate America. "One impetus for the expanding criminal prosecutions
of corporations was the revelation in the Watergate period that a number
of corporations had engaged in questionable political payments which had
the potential for corrupting political institutions in the United States and
abroad." FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 23, § 5.12.
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through voluntary disclosure and remedial action. 47 As the
practice expanded and yielded favorable results, lawyers
representing corporations vulnerable to government scrutiny
began to view the internal investigation as an important
defensive tool.48
B. The Expansion of Corporate Criminal Prosecutions
and the Impact of the Organizational Sentencing
Guidelines
By the 1980s, prosecutors and regulatory agencies across
the country were setting their sights on corporations.
Defense contract scandals and the savings and loan crisis
followed on the heels of the foreign payment and domestic
political contribution controversies.4 9  By 1984, when
Congress created the United States Sentencing Commission
in an effort to unify penal policies and minimize sentencing
disparities,1° a major change was underway. At that time,
17 An internal investigation and subsequent disclosure of questionable
payments to foreign government officials led to the Supreme Court's
landmark decision on the availability of the attorney-client and work-
product privileges to corporations in the context of an internal
investigation in Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981). See
infra text accompanying notes 135-40.
' Mathews, supra note 25, at 666. By the late 1980s and early 1990s
a number of commentators began to recommend internal investigations as
a defensive tool. See, e.g., Judah Best, A White Collar Defense Primer: An
Overview of Internal Corporate Investigations, Grand Jury Investigations
and Parallel Proceedings, with Emphasis on Problems of Former
Adjudication, Attorney-Client Privilege, Multiple Representation and
Prosecutorial Misconduct, in LITIGATION FOR THE NON-LITIGATOR: THE
ROLE OF THE CORPORATE LAWYER IN THE LITIGATION PROCESS, at 549 (PLI
Corporate Law & Practice Course, Handbook Series No. 584, 1987); Robert
S. Bennett et al., The Role of Internal Investigations in Defending Against
Charges of Corporate Misconduct, in HOW TO HANDLE INTERNAL
INVESTIGATIONS AND ESTABLISH SUCCESSFUL COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS, at 31
(PLI Corporate Law & Practice Course, Handbook Series No. 763, 1992).
49 BRICKEY, supra note 23, §§ 1:01-:02; see also BLACK, supra note 26,
at 1-2.
'0 Congress created the United States Sentencing Commission in the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 217, 98 Stat. 1987,
2017-26 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (2000)). See
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most federal prosecutions of corporations involved small,
closely held companies.51 By the end of the decade, however,
the annual number of prosecutions of publicly traded
corporations had increased dramatically,52 and cases were
receiving a great deal of media attention.53
On November 1, 1991, as the number of significant
corporate criminal prosecutions continued to grow, the
United States Sentencing Commission's Organizational
Sentencing Guidelines entered into effect.54 Pursuant to the
Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, entities, like
individuals, are sentenced on the basis of a "culpability
score" reflecting the nature and extent of the harm resulting
from the offense and the accused's prior record with respect
to criminal transgressions and other misconduct.55 For
generally U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A & ch. 8 (2002)
(containing the chapters entitled Introduction and Sentencing of
Organizations), available at http://www.ussc.gov/2002guid/tabcon02_2.htm
(last visited Oct. 21, 2003); 2001 U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N ANN. REP. 1, at
http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2001/ar01toc.htm (last visited Nov. 20,
2003). The Commission has seven voting members who are appointed by
the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, for six-year
terms. Three of the members are federal judges, and no more than four
may belong to the same political party. The Attorney General and the
chairman of the United States Parole Commission are ex officio members.
Id. at2.
" Mark A. Cohen, Corporate Crime and Punishment: An Update on
Sentencing Practice in the Federal Courts, 1988-90, 71 B.U. L. REV. 247,
251 (1991).
52 Id. at 252.
" See id. at 252 n.12.
14 Stephen S. Cowen, Federal Guidelines for Sentencing Organizations
and the Role of Compliance Programs, in CORPORATE COMPLIANCE 2000, at
43, 47 (PLI Corporate Law & Practice, Handbook Series No. 1177, 2000).
The primary objectives of the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines were
two-fold: to create uniformity in the sentencing of entities parallel to the
objectives the Guidelines were intended to achieve with respect to
individual offenders, and to promote "just punishment, adequate
deterrence, and incentives for organizations to maintain internal
mechanisms for preventing, detecting, and reporting criminal conduct."
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 8, introductory cmt (2002).
"U U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5 (2002). See generally
Cowen, supra note 54.
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organizations, other considerations factored into the score
include "involvement in or tolerance of the criminal
activity"56 (a severity factor that increases with the size of
the organization and the level of the person or persons
involved in the misconduct), 7 and evidence of obstruction of
justice or encouragement of obstructive practices. 8 An
organization may lower its culpability score-and thereby
decrease the severity of its sentence-by showing that, at the
time the offense occurred, the entity had in place an
"effective program to prevent and detect violations of the
law,"59 or by demonstrating "[sielf-reporting, cooperation, and
acceptance of responsibility" for the organization's wrongful
conduct.60
The Organizational Sentencing Guidelines were designed
to work in tandem with the provisions applicable to
individuals, 61 to cover the broad range of organizational
offenses with which federal prosecutors began to charge
corporate defendants during the 1990s. 62  In 1995, the
federal courts sentenced 111 organizational defendants
under the Guidelines,63 although 96% were still closely held
corporations.64 Courts imposed criminal fines as sanctions in
approximately 78% of the cases.65  The mean fine was
$242,892, and the median was $30,000.66 By 2000, 304
56 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5(b) (2002).
57 Id.
"' Id. § 8C2.5(e).
'9 Id. § 8C2.5(f).
60 Id. § 8C2.5(g).
" Id. at ch. 8, introductory cmt.
62 As the United States Sentencing Commission reported in 1995, for
several years after the Guidelines entered into effect, the federal courts
continued to impose sentences that were not subject to the guidelines
because the actual indictments predated the effective date of the
Guidelines for the particular offenses charged. 1995 U.S. SENTENCING
COMM'N ANN. REP. 120-22, http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/1995/ch5_95.pdf
(last visited Oct. 21, 2003).
63 Id. at 121.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 124.
66 Id. at 124-25.
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organizations received sentences under the Guidelines,
19.2% more than in 1999 and 38.2 % more than in 1998.67 Of
these companies, 87.5% pled guilty.68 The highest fine
reached $53 million, and the mean was $2,316,732,69 nearly
ten times the mean fine in 1995. In 2001, the number of
organizations sentenced dropped to 238, a 21.7% decrease
from 2000,1o but the incidence of guilty pleas increased to
92.4%.71 The overall mean for fines was comparable to that
of the preceding year at $2,154,929, with a mean of
$3,399,151 for offenses subject to section 8C2.1. 72 The three
largest financial sanctions were fines of $134 million and $53
million in antitrust cases and $50.1 million in a fraud case.73
Since the establishment of the federal Corporate Fraud Task
Force in mid 2002, the number of investigations and
indictments of major corporations and corporate constituents
appears to be climbing at an even faster rate.
4
The financial debacles and other corporate scandals of the
last few years have added dramatic impetus to the push for
prosecution of corporate offenders.7  Sarbanes-Oxley
7 6
67 2000 U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N ANN. REP. 45, http://www.ussc.gov/
ANNRPT/2000/ArOOchap5.pdf (last visited Oct. 21, 2003).
68 Id.
69 Id. at 47.
70 Id.; 2001 U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N ANN. REP. 48,





74 See, e.g., supra note 3, text accompanying notes 3-5, and infra notes
174-85.
7' For a discussion of the reasons for the financial debacles of the past
eighteen months, as well as insights into the creation of "a culture ripe for
corporate fraud," see William S. Duffey, Jr., Corporate Fraud and
Accountability: A Primer on Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 54 S.C. L. REV.
405 (2002). For examples of criminal prosecutions, see supra note 3;
Former Enron Exec Pleads Guilty, Agrees to Pay $12 Million, supra note 6
(quoting SEC Enforcement Division Director Stephen Cutler to the effect
that the Kopper prosecution "is the first in what we anticipate to be a
series of actions... to make sure that all those responsible [for the Enron
debacle] answer for their misdeeds."); Three Plead Guilty to $24 Million
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reflects the current enforcement climate: legislators, law
enforcement authorities, and the public are united in
demanding greater corporate accountability.7 The new law
Tax Fraud Involving Import of Chemicals, 16 No. 4 WHITE-COLLAR CRIME
REP. 1 (2002); Fla. Brokerage's Two Top Officers Indicted for Multimillion-
Dollar Fraud, 16 No. 7 WHITE-COLLAR CRIME REP. 1 (2002); Adelphia Execs
Indicted in $2 Billion Fraud Scheme, 16 No.11 WHITE-COLLAR CRIME REP.
1 (2002); Louisiana-Pacific Enters Guilty Pleas, WASH. POST, May 30,
1998, at G06 (reporting corporation's entry of guilty plea and payment of
$37 million fine for violation of Clean Air Act.); Press Release, U.S. Dep't
of Justice, TAP Pharmaceutical Products, Inc. and Seven Others Charged
with Health Care Crimes; Company Agrees to Pay $875 Million to Settle
Charges (Oct. 3, 2001), at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2001/October/
513civ.htm. For examples of major civil enforcement proceedings and
accompanying sanctions, see Charles Gasparino, Time to Clean Up Those
Files, WALL ST. J., Feb. 28, 2003, at Al (reporting agreement of Credit
Suisse First Boston to pay civil settlements totaling hundreds of millions
of dollars); Jeff Gerth, 2 Companies Pay Penalties for Improving China
Rockets, N.Y. TIMES, March 6, 2003, at A9 (reporting that Hughes
Electronics Corporation and Boeing Satellite Systems agreed to pay $32
million in civil penalties in connection with technology transfers to China,
while Lockheed Martin and Loral Space and Communications Corporation
paid $13 and $20 million respectively to settle "similar cases."); Kurt
Eichenwald, Hospital Company Agrees to Pay $745 Million on U.S. Fraud
Case, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2000, at Al; David Cay Johnston, A.A.R.P. Sets
Up a Taxable Subsidiary, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 1999, at C9 (reporting on
American Association of Retired Persons' agreement to resolve dispute
with Internal Revenue Service through annual payments of $15 million).
76 Sarbanes-Oxley Act, supra note 4.
'7 This convergence of interests is likely to keep the number of
corporate criminal prosecutions elevated for some time to come. See
generally William S. Duffey, Jr., Corporate Fraud and Accountability: A
Primer on Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 54 S.C. L. REV. 405 (2002). As
Duffey points out, "Sarbanes-Oxley in many respects imposes what
responsible corporate executives have urged in the past-honesty in
financial disclosures, management accountability for the financial affairs
of the corporation, and avoidance of personal financial interest or conflict
in decision-making by corporate executives." Id. at 406. Simply put,
"[slenior management is expected to know how the corporation earns its
income and what risks the corporation is undertaking in the course of
carrying out its business. Management should never put personal
interests ahead of or in conflict with the interests of the corporation." THE
BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE iii (2002)
(quoting Duffey, supra, at 406).
COLUMBIA BUSINESS LA W REVIEW [Vol. 2003
INTERNAL CORPORATE INVESTIGATIONS
imposes a number of measures designed to enhance
corporate honesty and accountability. It imposes individual
responsibility for financial statement certification on
corporate chief executive and chief financial officers, 8
expands whistleblower protections,79  and creates new
obstruction-of-justice crimes relating to destruction of or
tampering with corporate records."0  It also increases
criminal penalties under several federal criminal statutes,
including the mail and wire fraud statutes,8 ' the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974,2 and the Securities
71 Sarbanes-Oxley Act, supra note 4.
79 See id. § 806.
80 Id. §§ 802, 1102. These new provisions amend 18 U.S.C. § 1512 and
add 18 U.S.C. §§ 1519 & 1520. They augment pre-existing obstruction-of-
justice provisions. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1505, 1516-1518 (2000). In
addition to the criminal statutes, ethical rules also bar lawyers from
engaging in destruction, concealment or alteration of documents or other
evidence. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4(a) (2003).
8' 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2000 & Supp. 2002) (mail fraud) & 18 U.S.C. §
1343 (2000 & Supp. 2002) (wire fraud). For review and analysis of the
criminal provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation, see John J. Falway
& Matthew A. Wolfman, The Criminal Provisions of For a Sarbanes-Oxley:
A Tale of Sound and Fury, 16 No. 11 WHITE-COLLAR CRIME REP. 1 (2002).
As the authors state, "there can be no question that, post-Sarbanes-Oxley,
we have begun to and will continue to see a huge enforcement push
directed at securities and other corporate crime." Id. Section 807 of the
Act adds a catch-all securities fraud offense, 18 U.S.C. § 1348 (2000 &
Supp. 2002); section 302 requires certification of financial statements by a
corporation's chief executive officer ("CEO") and chief financial officer
("CFO") with criminal penalties for false certifications, 18 U.S.C. § 1350;
section 802 amends an existing obstruction-of-justice provision, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1512, and creates two new obstruction-of-justice provisions applicable to
document destruction, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1519 & 1520; section 806 adds a
private cause of action, for retaliation against corporate whistleblowers to
existing criminal law provisions, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A; sections 902 through
906 and section 1106 increase the penalties for a number of existing white-
collar crimes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, 1349; 29 U.S.C. § 1131; and section
905 requires the United States Sentencing Commission to review
guidelines applicable to specified corporate crimes, 28 U.S.C. § 994. See,
e.g., Duffey, supra note 77.
82 Sarbanes-Oxley Act, supra note 4, § 904. Violations of ERISA are
now punishable by fines of up to $100,000 in fines for individuals and
$500,000 for organizations. Id.
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Exchange Act of 1934.83 Pursuant to the requirements of
Sarbanes-Oxley and emergency authority provided by the
statute,84  the United States Sentencing Commission
("USSC") recently amended federal sentencing guidelines for
fraud-related offenses, obstruction of justice and related
offenses to increase sanctions.85  The SEC has also
promulgated new rules governing attorney disclosure of
corporate misconduct.86
83 Sarbanes-Oxley Act, supra note 4, § 804.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, supra note 4, § 805, 905 & 1104.
85 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL SUPPLEMENT (effective
Jan. 25, 2003), at http://www.ussc.gov/2002suppa/2002supp.pdf (last
visited Oct. 22, 2003).
86 Section 307 of Sarbanes-Oxley, 15 U.S.C. § 7245, directed the SEC,
within 180 days of the law's enactment, to issue rules "setting forth
minimum standards of professional conduct for attorneys appearing before
the Commission in any way in the representation of issuers." The statute
instructed the Commission to promulgate rules requiring attorneys to
report material violations of securities laws, breaches of fiduciary duty, or
other legal violations by the company or any of its agents to the chief legal
officer and/or chief executive officer of the company, and, in the event of a
failure to respond appropriately, to report the matter to the audit
committee or other relevant committee of the company's board. Id. The
SEC issued a final rule pursuant to the statutory mandate on January 23,
2003. The Commission also voted to propose a rule requiring issuers to
publicly disclose withdrawal of counsel or written notice of the absence of
an appropriate response to a report of a material violation. Id. See
Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys Appearing and Practicing
Before the Commission in the Representation of an Issuer, 17 C.F.R. § 205
(2003); Final Rule: Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct
for Attorneys, at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8185.htm (modified
Sept. 26, 2003). For a summary of the rules the SEC has promulgated to
date pursuant to Sarbanes-Oxley, see the SEC's Spotlight on Sarbanes-
Oxley Rulemaking and Reports, at http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/sarbanes-
oxley.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2003). The American Bar Association and
many other professional bodies have hotly debated, and continue to
debate, the new attorney conduct rules and related proposals. See, e.g.,
Attorneys Call for Delay, More Discussion of SEC Rule Proposals on Noisy
Withdrawal, 71 U.S.L.W. 2407 (2002); ABA Panelists Assess How
Sarbanes-Oxley SEC Rules Will Change Practice and Ethics, 71 U.S.L.W.
2526 (2003). For a discussion of relevant ethical issues, see Michael L.
Fox, To Tell or Not to Tell: Legal Ethics and Disclosure After Enron, 2002
COLUM. BUs. L. REV. 867; Larry P. Scriggins, Legal Ethics, Confidentiality,
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C. Spiraling Civil Liability and Other Consequences of
Corporate Misconduct
Along with increasing risk of criminal prosecution,
corporate defendants also are facing staggering potential
civil liability on a variety of fronts. Both government-
initiated actions and whistleblower lawsuits pursuant to the
Civil False Claims Act87 impose huge financial burdens on
corporations and other entities because of the statute's
extraordinary penalty provisions.88 A number of highly
publicized settlements have ranged in the tens of millions of
dollars, and some have involved hundreds of millions.89
Shareholder derivative suits pose another particularly
troublesome liability risk for corporate defendants.90 The
Delaware Chancery Court's landmark decision in In re
and the Organizational Client, 58 Bus. L. REV. 123 (2002); Thomas H.
Watkins, Ethics: Are Lawyers the Last Line of Defense for Critical
Accounting Issues Under Sarbanes-Oxley?, in 23RD ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON
COMPUTER LAW, at 531 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks & Literary
Property Course, Handbook Series No. 735, 2003); Roger C. Cramton,
Enron and the Corporate Lawyer: A Primer on Legal and Ethical Issues, 58
Bus. LAw. 143, 144 (2002) ('The Enron affair and the flood of other recent
corporate scandals (e.g., Adelphia, Arthur Andersen, ... Dynergy, Global
Crossing, Tyco, WorldCom, Xerox) have led to a loss of investor and public
confidence in the integrity of the securities and other markets that make
American capitalism work.").
87 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2000).
' The Civil False Claims Act provides for treble damages and
mandatory fines ranging from a minimum of $5,000 to a maximum of
$10,000.00 per claim. 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2000).
" See, e.g., In re Caremark Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2d 959 (Del.
Ch. 1996). See generally Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Justice Dept.
Civil Fraud Recoveries Total $2.1 Billion for FY 2003; False Claims Act
Recoveries Exceed $12 Billion Since 1986 (Nov. 10, 2003), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa'pr/2003/November/03-civ-613.htm.
0 See Dennis J. Block & Nancy E. Barton, Internal Corporate
Investigations: Implications of the Attorney-Client Privilege and Work-
Product Doctrine, in INTERNAL CORPORATE INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 12,
at 85; Anitha Reddy, BearingPoint Is Sued by Its Shareholders; Class
Actions Part of Broader Trend, Study Finds, WASH. POST, Sept. 12, 2003,
at E05; see generally, Mathews, supra note 25, at 673.
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Caremark, Inc.91 held that corporate directors have a
fiduciary duty to establish monitoring systems to prevent,
and when necessary correct, criminal misconduct on the part
of corporate employees and agents.92  The court upheld
settlement of the action for minimal monetary payment on
grounds that Caremark's directors had taken steps to fulfill
the duty of care to ensure corporate adherence to applicable
law.93 The court's conclusion that Caremark's directors had
met their obligations was somewhat surprising given the
extraordinarily pervasive wrongdoing.9 6 Even so, the case is
significant because it established the potential liability of
corporate directors for failing to monitor their organizations'
compliance with legal obligations95 in the jurisdiction that is
home to many of the largest and most influential American
businesses corporations. Recognition of directors'
responsibility for legal compliance paved the way for
subsequent shareholder derivative actions alleging breach of
fiduciary duty in the wake of criminal and civil enforcement
proceedings against corporations.96 At present, managers of
any public company convicted of a significant criminal
offense or sanctioned in a major civil enforcement proceeding
must anticipate subsequent shareholder derivative litigation.
9' 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
92 Id. at 970.
93 Id. at 971-72.
9" A number of Caremark facilities were implicated in the wrongdoing,
and the company paid more than $250 million to resolve related matters.
Id. at 960-61.
95 See 698 A.2d at 970. See also, e.g., In re Abbott Laboratories
Shareholder Derivative Litigation, 325 F. 3d 795, 808 (7th Cir. 2003);
McCall v. Averhoff, 239 F.2d 808, 817 (2nd Cir. 1956), amended on denial
of rehearing; McCall v. Scott, 250 F.3d 497 (6th Cir. 2001). See generally
Carole Basri & Irving Kagan, The Caremark Case and Directors' Duty to
Establish Compliance Programs, in CORPORATE LEGAL DEPARTMENTS §§
16:4, 16:8 (2002); AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.01 cmt. (1994)
[hereinafter PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE]; MODEL Bus. CORP.
ACT § 8.31 cmt. (f) (1984).
96 See Reddy, supra note 90.
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Debarment-exclusion from eligibility for government
contracts-is yet another serious financial risk for
corporations that arises in connection with criminal and
some kinds of civil liability.97 For companies that rely on
government contracts for all or a significant percentage of
their business, debarment can be a fatal sanction. Similarly,
while companies that are not government contractors do not
face debarment, corporations convicted of criminal offenses
or subjected to significant civil penalties or settlements
under statutes such as the False Claims Act,98 stand to pay a
high price in the marketplace as a result of both business
losses and potentially devastating stock devaluations when
allegations of misconduct become public.9 9 At the same time,
these events are enormously disruptive to the company's
ongoing business. They distract managers and employees
alike from both daily operations and long-range planning.
They also demand extraordinary resources, particularly from
senior managers, even though corporate managers may have
had nothing to do with the alleged misconduct.
Companies facing criminal liability or serious civil
sanctions are also likely to incur enormous legal bills in
connection with their defense and the implementation of
measures to remedy the problems that led to the underlying
legal difficulties.10 Finally, individual officers, directors,
employees, agents, and other corporate constituents
implicated in misconduct face consequences ranging from
monetary sanctions to loss of career and livelihood, and even
imprisonment. 101
" The causes for debarment and related procedures for government
contractors are set forth in the Federal Acquisition Regulations, 48 C.F.R.
§ 9.406-2 (2003).
98 31 U.S.C. §§ 3724-33 (2000).
9 See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 51, at 266-67.
100 See, e.g., Dennis K. Berman, Qwest Is Spending Top Dollar to
Defend Accounting Practices, WALL ST. J., March 10, 2003, at C1.
101 See supra note 75.
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D. The Importance of the Internal Investigation in
Modern Corporate Legal Practice
The rapid rise in the incidence of criminal prosecution of
major corporations, the implementation of the USSC's
Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, the expanding bases
of corporate civil liability, and the current national focus on
curbing "corporate greed"10 2  have created compelling
incentives for organizations to act promptly to discover and
correct acts and omissions that pose significant liability
risks. The internal investigation is the tool that permits
them to do so. The circumstances that prompt internal
investigations are myriad: evidence of irregular stock trades,
allegations of illegal employment discrimination, the results
of an internal audit, an anonymous tip about billing
irregularities, a civil suit, the sudden departure of a key
employee, an inquiry or site inspection by regulatory agency
personnel, a customer complaint, a civil investigative
demand, a grand jury subpoena, or any of a vast assortment
of other reasons. 10 3  Internal investigations often are
undertaken when corporate officials learn of pending
investigations or legal actions instituted against the
company and seek to evaluate risk, correct systemic
problems, or take action to mitigate legal exposure for the
102 In the words of Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan, we are
suffering the effects of a corporate culture of "infectious greed." Richard
W. Stevenson & Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Fed Chief Blames Corporate Greed;
House Revises Bill, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2002, at Al. The White House,
too, has condemned corporate malfeasance and called for widespread
reforms. See, e.g., Press Release, White House, Fact Sheet: Corporate
Fraud Conference Sponsored by President's Corporate Fraud Task Force
(Sept. 26, 2002), at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/
20020926-2.html ("The Administration continues to pursue an aggressive
agenda to fight corporate fraud and abuse," including "[e]xposing and
punishing acts of corruption," [hiolding corporate officers and directors
accountable," and "[mioving corporate accounting out of the shadows.") Id.
".. For discussions of common triggers of internal investigations, see,
for example, Raymond C. Marshall, Conducting Internal Investigations-
What to Do and Not to Do, in CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL
LAWS, at 25 (Am. Law Inst.-Am. Bar Ass'n Course of Study, No. SG014,
2001); Kuehne, supra note 3, at 661-66.
[Vol. 2003
INTERNAL CORPORATE INVESTIGATIONS
entity and its constituents. In some instances, internal
investigations are mandated by statutes' such as the Anti-
Kickback Enforcement Act of 1986,105 the Medicare Fraud
Reporting Act, 10 6 and federal banking regulations. 107 In other
situations the rules of industry entities and associations,
such as the New York Stock Exchange,0 8 the American Stock
Exchange, 10 9 and the National Association of Securities
104 See generally Thomas E. Holliday & Charles J. Stevens, Disclosure
of Results of Internal Investigations to the Government or Other Third
Parties, in INTERNAL CORPORATE INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 12, at 283-85.
105 41 U.S.C. § 57 (2000) (requiring government contractors to file
written report with Inspector General of contracting federal agency
whenever there are reasonable grounds to believe that a kickback may
have occurred among contracting parties).
106 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(a)(3) (2000) (felony offense for a person with
"knowledge of... any event affecting his initial or continued right to
any.., benefit or payment" to "conceal or fail to disclose" that event).
117 See, e.g., 12 C.F.R § 21.11 (1989).
108 See New York Stock Exchange Rule 342.21 (member firms must
undertake investigation of trades that appear to violate law). See
generally, Ralph C. Ferraro, Internal Corporate Investigations and the
SEC's Message to Directors in Cooper Companies, 65 U. CIN. L. REV. 75
(1996). New York Stock Exchange rules require members to report
employee violations of "any securities law or regulation, or any agreement
with or rule or standards of conduct of any governmental agency, self-
regulatory organization, or business or professional organization." NYSE
Rule 351(a)(1). NYSE Rule 351(a)(10) mandates disclosure of significant
disciplinary actions against employees-i.e., those "involving suspension,
termination, the withholding of commissions or impositions of fines in
excess of $2500, or any other significant limitation on activities." Mere
suspicion of violations, including the decision to initiate an internal
investigation, does not require reporting, but NYSE Rule 351(e) requires
periodic reporting of unresolved investigations into possible insider
trading by employees or member firms. See Susan L. Merrill, Internal
Investigations, in SECURITIES LITIGATION: PLANNING & STRATEGIES, at 91,
115-16 (Am. Law Inst.-Am. Bar Ass'n Course of Study, No. SG091, 2002).
'o9 American Stock Exchange, Sec. 401, Outline of Exchange Disclosure
Policies (pertaining to required inquiries and disclosures), at
http://wallstreet.cch.com/americanstockexchangeamex/amexcompanyguide
listingstandards,policiesandrequirements/part4/disclosuress40l-
404/072F000374.asp (last visited Oct. 22, 2003).
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Dealers,11° require ongoing investigation and/or disclosure in
situations involving suspicious circumstances or allegations
of wrongdoing,' and federal securities laws mandate
disclosure of facts material to the financial status of publicly
traded companies.'12
Not every allegation of wrongdoing requires investigation,
and, in some instances, an entity may be in a more
vulnerable position after investigating."3 Nevertheless, the
internal investigation has become the standard of care
whenever credible allegations of significant misconduct are
raised in organizational settings."4 As one commentator has
noted:
110 N.A.S.D. Conduct Rule 3070 (regarding required disclosures), at
http://cchwallstreet.com/nasd/nasdviewer.asp?SelectedNode=3&FileName
=/nasd/nasdrules/RulesoftheAssociation mg.xml#chp 13_63 (last visited
Oct. 22, 2003).
... See sources cited supra notes 108-09.
112 See generally 15 U.S.C. § 78m (2000).
113 See supra note 10. As one expert notes:
First, if confidentiality of the investigative work product
cannot be maintained, the corporation by conducting an
investigation merely may be building a case on behalf of
the company's private or governmental adversaries,
against the corporation's interest and the interests of its
shareholders. Second, depending on what corporate
skeletons are turned up, in light of the company's
disclosure obligations under the federal securities laws, the
company by investigating may be forced to make more
negative disclosures than it otherwise would, thereby
injuring its shareholders. In addition, the information
uncovered, if publicized, may embarrass or physically
endanger employees, agents, or other involved individuals
and may cause existing or potential customers to shift their
business to the company's competitors.
Mathews, supra note 25, at 672 (footnote omitted).
114 "[I]nternal investigations are a critical tool through which
corporations (both publicly and privately-held) can achieve accountability
either in the eyes of the public generally or its stockholders." McLaughlin
& McCarthy, supra note 10, at 993 (citing Anne C. Flannery and Jennifer
S. Milano, Protection of Internal Corporate Investigative Materials Under
the Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product Doctrine, METROPOLITAN
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[MIany prosecutors and regulators have come to
expect that with the slightest hint of trouble,
corporations will investigate themselves and, indeed,
upon the discovery of trouble turn themselves in to
authorities. Whereas, in the past, companies were
given extraordinary credit for investigating
themselves and laying their problems before the
Government, today it is often simply expected-the
punishment for failing to investigate and report
illegal conduct can be severe . . . Like it or not,
internal investigations are now a part of a company's
daily life and a part of the regulatory landscape." 5
While corporate managers once worried about what an
investigation might uncover, in the wake of the Enron,
World Com, Tyco and other recent corporate financial
fiascos, the risks of failing to recognize significant legal
problems-for corporations, individuals implicated in the
challenged conduct, innocent employees, investors and the
public-are greater than ever before.
1 16
CORPORATE COUNSEL, Dec. 1997, and Stanley S. Arkin, Internal Corporate
Investigations, 216 N.Y. L.J. 3 (1996)).
' Merrill, supra note 108, at 95. See also, e.g., Kuehne, supra note 3,
at 652 ("Today, business survival, may well depend upon the existence and
effectiveness of an internal corporate investigation plan and compliance
program.").
116 See, e.g., Scott D. Hammond, When Calculating the Costs and
Benefits of Applying for Corporate Amnesty, How Do You Put a Price Tag
on an Individual's Freedom?, in CORPORATE COMPLIANCE 2001, at 325, 328
(PLI Corporate Law & Practice Course, Handbook Series No. 1248, 2001).
"It is a far riskier proposition today to roll the dice and choose not to report
antitrust wrongdoing than it used to be." Id. The Antitrust Division of
the DOJ has an Amnesty Plus program that offers amnesty to a company
that reports an antitrust violation and cooperates in the full investigation
of the suspected offense, but the benefits of the program are available only
to the first reporter. Id. With respect to subsequent offenses,
[i]f a company is knowledgeable about a second offense and
decides not to report it, and the conduct is later discovered
and successfully prosecuted, where appropriate, [the
Antitrust Division] will urge the sentencing court to
consider the company's and any culpable executive's failure
to report the conduct voluntarily as an aggravating
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E. The Mechanics of the Internal Investigation and the
Pivotal Importance of the Employee Interview
Generally, internal investigations endeavor to answer the
following kinds of questions: (1) Has misconduct occurred?
(2) What is the nature and scope of the misconduct? (3) Is
the problem past history, or is it ongoing? (4) Who is
involved? (5) Who is responsible? (6) Why did the
misconduct occur? (6) How widespread is it-i.e., is this an
isolated instance or a systemic problem? Once these
questions are answered to the extent possible under the
particular circumstances, decision makers must address
another set of questions: (1) What remedial steps need to be
taken to ensure that the problem does not occur again? (2) Is
it necessary or appropriate to mete out disciplinary
sanctions? (3) How can any the company remedy any
damage and redress any injuries? (4) Would it be prudent to
initiate corporate compliance measures, or revamp an
existing compliance program? (5) Must, or should, the
corporation disclose any misconduct uncovered by the
investigation to federal and/or state authorities? The last
question is perhaps the most critical for the welfare of the
organization and individuals implicated in the alleged
misconduct.
Once the necessity for an internal investigation becomes
apparent, and the overall objectives of the inquiry are
sentencing factor... [and] pursue a fine or jail sentence at
the upper end of the Guidelines range.
Id. at 332. As a result of this policy,
[I]or a company, the failure to self report under the
Amnesty Plus program could mean the difference between
a potential fine as high as 80 percent or more of the volume
of affected commerce versus no fine at all on the Amnesty
Plus product. For the individual, it could mean the




defined,117 a number of questions arise about who should
conduct the project and how the investigators should go
about conducting their inquiries.118  Not surprisingly,
lawyers almost always believe that counsel should undertake
internal investigations. There are two principal reasons: (1)
the need for legal expertise to determine whether questioned
acts or omissions violate the law, and (2) the availability of
the protections of the attorney-client and work-product
privileges. 119
Lawyers themselves debate questions such as whether
inside or outside counsel are best suited to handle particular
investigations, 2 ° and whether the approval of the company's
117 In general, the precise objectives and scope of the investigation are
not finalized until it is determined who will investigate-e.g., an outside
law firm, in-house counsel, or a combination of the two-and the lawyers
conducting the investigation have had an opportunity to review and advise
the client's representatives on the relevant law and other important
considerations.
118 For discussions of various approaches, see, for example, Bennett et
al., supra note 48, at 40-41, 46, 58-64; Marshall, supra note 103; Best,
supra note 48, at 553-54, 559-63; Gregory J. Wallace & Jay W. Waks,
Internal Investigation of Suspected Wrongdoing by Corporate Employees,
in ADVANCED CORPORATE COMPLIANCE WORKSHOP 2000, at 507, 510-11 (PLI
Corporate Law and Practice Course, Handbook Series No. 507, 2000).
..9 See Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 394 (1981); discussion infra
at text accompanying notes 135-70. See generally PAUL R. RICE,
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE UNITED STATES § 4.14 (2d ed., updated
2003).
120 The consensus is that outside counsel should ordinarily direct the
investigation. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 118. Of course, many of
the commentators are members of law firms. Nevertheless, there are
some important reasons why it may be useful to have outside counsel
involved. Retention of outside counsel may enhance privilege protection-
because the work of inside counsel may sometimes be construed as
unprivileged business advice rather than protected legal counsel; outside
law firms generally can call up more resources to handle investigations on
an expedited basis; and involvement of outside counsel may relieve inside
lawyers of the burden of investigating senior managers and coworkers.
See, e.g., Bennett et al., supra note 48, at 38-41; Merrill, supra note 108, at
97-98. In addition, government officials traditionally have been more
willing to credit the results of investigations conducted by outside counsel,
although the failure of major law firms adequately to address serious
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board of directors is necessary to initiate an internal
investigation-usually in situations involving allegations of
serious misconduct, charges of pervasive wrongdoing, or
accusations against senior managers.121 Other issues that
frequently arise include deciding to whom investigators
should report their findings'22 and whether they should
deliver their analysis orally or in writing.23 There are many
possible ways to go about an investigation. Relevant factors
encompass, among others, the urgency of the matter, the
nature of the allegations, the scope of the perceived problem,
the level of those purportedly involved, the need for prior
and/or ongoing consultation with the board of directors, and
the extent of potential disruption of business operations.'24
Most commentators agree that it is usually best to begin
with obtaining and reviewing relevant documents.125  It is
corporate issues in recent corporate scandals casts some doubt on the
validity of this conclusion. See id.
121 See, e.g., Kuehne, supra note 3, at 665; BLACK, supra note 26, §
2.02.
122 See, e.g., BLACK, supra note 26, § 5.01; Kuehne, supra note 3, at
681; Merrill, supra note 108, at 120-21; Bennett et al., supra note 48, at
58.
123 See, e.g., BLACK, supra note 26, § 5.01; Kuehne, supra note 3, at
681; Merrill, supra note 108, at 120-21; Bennett et al., supra note 48, at
58.
124 See generally BLACK, supra note 26, § 6.03; Marshall, supra note
103, at 30; Turk, supra note 12, at 93.
121 Often, however, factors such as timing or geographic location of
facilities and employees, as well as the preferences of the client
constituents who retain counsel, mandate selection of one strategy over
another. See, e.g., Bennett et al., supra note 48, at 46-47. For example, an
internal investigation initiated by the directors of a company already in
severe financial difficulty or subject to intensive government investigation
may have a shape and scope quite different from that initiated by the
managers of a corporation in good financial health for the purpose of
following up on an indication of a discrete problem. The last-ditch
investigative effort conducted at the request of the Enron board by
William Powers, Jr., Dean of the University of Texas Law School, is an
example of the former. See, e.g., Report of Investigation by the Special
Investigative Committee of the Board of Directors of Enron Corporation,
supra note 9; Christopher Stern, U.S. Seeks Delay in Publication of
WorldCom Report, WASH. POST, March 13, 2003, at E02. It is more
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clear that immediate steps should be taken to prevent the
destruction of any possibly relevant documents, as well as
email messages, video and audio recordings, or any of a host
of other potentially related materials.126 The passage of
Sarbanes-Oxley heightens existing document protection
requirements. While, prior to the Act's passage, deliberate
document destruction could result in prosecution for
obstruction of justice,127 the new law expands the potential
bases for criminal liability for "altering, concealing
mutilating, destroying or otherwise falsifying" documents 128
in connection with official proceedings including judicial,
agency and Congressional proceedings,'129 and it adds new
record-keeping requirements for audit papers."' With
respect to an internal investigation, these provisions
heighten the importance of finding and securing relevant
documentation and other records as soon as the need for the
inquiry becomes evident.
131
While documents may provide the clearest record of key
events or transactions, the most revealing information comes
from employees. Thus, the pivotal element of almost every
internal investigation-and the most informative and
difficult to find examples of the latter because they are far less likely ever
to come to light. One example that did is the inquiry conducted by Upjohn
Company that led to the Supreme Court's landmark decision on the
applicability of the attorney-client and work-product privileges in the
corporate context. See infra text accompanying notes 135-72.
126 A commonly utilized tool is a written memorandum ("non-destruct
memorandum") instructing employees not to discard or destroy any
relevant documents or other materials. See, e.g., Bennett et al., supra note
48, at 560; BLACK, supra note 26, § 5.01; Kuehne, supra note 3, at 679;
Wallace & Waks, supra note 118, at 509.
127 See supra note 80.
128 Sarbanes-Oxley Act, supra note 4, § 802(a) (to be codified at 18
U.S.C. §1519).
129 Id.
131 Sarbanes-Oxley Act, supra note 4, § 802(a) (to be codified at 18
U.S.C. § 1520).
131 This is the function of a "non-destruct" memorandum to all
personnel, agents and other constituents who may have relevant records of
any kind. See supra note 126.
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stressful part for all concerned-is the employee interview.
From line employees to senior managers, the people who act
on behalf of the corporation are best able to explain critical
events and provide relevant background information.
Without this information, investigators are likely to lack a
clear picture of key events, and the objectives of the inquiry
may be frustrated. Conversely, when employees cooperate in
an internal investigation, investigators have an opportunity
to put events in context. Information provided in interviews
helps counsel to get a sense of the organization's culture, to
learn about key personalities, and to assess witness
demeanor and credibility. Documents are the bare bones,
but interviews are the heart and soul of an internal
investigation. Correspondingly, it is in the interview phase
that difficult ethical issues most often arise. Before turning
to a discussion of these dilemmas, however, it is important to
understand the effect of persistent demands by prosecutors
and regulatory agencies for privilege waivers, and other
kinds of organizational "cooperation."
III. THE IMPACT OF GOVERNMENT DEMANDS
FOR PRIVILEGE WAIVERS AND OTHER
CORPORATE COOPERATION
In the 1960s and 1970s, as discussed above,3 2 internal
investigations most often took place as a result of
enforcement proceedings. For example, consent decrees
between publicly traded companies and the SEC frequently
incorporated requirements for internal investigations
initiated by independent board members, conducted by
special counsel, and sometimes monitored by a federal
district judge or agency personnel.133 In these contexts,
questions of privilege rarely arose. As organizations began
to engage in their own investigations in efforts to avoid
criminal and civil liability, the importance of the protections
afforded by the attorney-client and work-product privileges
132 See supra text accompanying notes 30-48.
133 See supra text accompanying notes 32-36.
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became clear. So long as the fruits of internal investigations
were viewed as confidential attorney-client communications
and attorney work product, both counsel and corporate
clients had substantial leeway to explore possible courses of
action to address investigative findings.
Prosecutors and agency enforcement personnel, however,
began to seek access to the results of internal investigations,
including attorneys' notes and memoranda. The
government's interest in information gathered by corporate
investigators is understandable. This is especially true in
voluntary disclosure situations in which corporate counsel
has handled all or most of the relevant investigation. Law
enforcement authorities have a legitimate concern that the
government cannot accurately assess the full scope of the
misconduct at issue and the degree to which both the entity
and individuals may be criminally liable without accurate
and complete information. Prosecutors are justifiably wary
of attempts to shield culpable senior managers from liability
at the expense of the entity and its shareholders.
Consequently, they argued that attorney-client and work-
product privileges should not protect materials gathered or
created in the course of internal investigations. The debate
over the applicability of the attorney-client and work-product
privileges to internal investigations at issue in federal
judicial proceedings came to a head in 1981 in Upjohn Co. v.
United States.'
A. Upjohn and the Role of the Attorney-Client and
Work-Product Privileges in the Context of Internal
Investigations
The debate in Upjohn Co. v. United States 3 5 focused on
the scope of the attorney-client and work-product privileges
in the context of Federal Rule of Evidence 501: "the privilege
of a witness ... shall be governed by the principles of the
common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the
'3 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
135 Id.
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United States in light of reason and experience. '1 6  The
contested materials consisted of the fruits of an internal
investigation of questionable foreign payments. Upjohn's
general counsel initiated the investigation after obtaining
advice from outside counsel and consulting with the
chairman of the company's board of directors. 137 When the
Internal Revenue Service subpoenaed questionnaires sent to
and returned by Upjohn employees around the world, as well
as documents, memoranda and notes gathered or written by
counsel in the course of the investigation, the company
asserted that the materials were protected by the attorney-
client and work-product privileges. The government
sought enforcement of the administrative subpoena in the
United States District Court for the Western District of
Michigan, 139 contending that the documents were not
protected by either privilege. 140 With respect to the attorney-
client privilege, the government argued that neither of the
approaches then utilized by various federal appellate
courts-the control group test or the subject matter test 4 '
protected Upjohn's materials . 4  The district court, on the
basis of a United States Magistrate's recommendations, held
that Upjohn had waived its attorney-client privilege.4  The
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
overruled the lower court on the waiver issue144 and applied a
136 449 U.S. at 389 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 501).
137 449 U.S. at 386.
138 Id. at 388.
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 Id. The control group test considers whether purportedly privileged
documents reflect communications between counsel and corporate
constituents who have authority to control the corporation's actions,
including the investigation itself. The subject matter test focuses instead
on whether the communication is within the subject matter of the
constituent's corporate responsibilities. For discussion of these tests in
comparison with the Upjohn decision, see RICE, supra note 119, § 4.14.
142 449 U.S. at 388.
143 Id.
141 Id. at 388; United States v. Upjohn Co., 600 F.2d 1223, 1225-27 (2d
Cir. 1966).
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version of the control group test. The appellate court held
that the communications at issue were privileged only
insofar as they were limited to exchanges between Upjohn's
lawyers and the senior executives controlling the company's
response to the relevant legal advice, and remanded the case
for determination of the members of the control group. 45
The Second Circuit also ruled against the company on the
work-product privilege claim,146 opining that the doctrine did
not apply to administrative summonses.'47
The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit and held
in favor of Upjohn on both issues.' The Court ruled that
corporations have a right to assert the attorney-client and
work-product privileges to protect the confidentiality of
corporate attorneys' communications with client
representatives, as well as notes and memoranda prepared
by counsel in the context of an internal investigation. 4 9 In
reaching this conclusion, the Court specifically rejected the
control group test adopted by the court of appeals 5 ° and
declined to adopt the competing subject-matter test. 5' The
Court, in an opinion by then Justice Rehnquist, reasoned
that the control group test "frustrates the very purpose of the
privilege by discouraging the communication of relevant
information by employees of the client to attorneys seeking
to render legal advice to the client corporation." 52 The Court
noted that "corporations, unlike most individuals, 'constantly
145 449 U.S. at 388; 600 F.2d at 1227.
146 449 U.S. at 389; 600 F.2d at 1227.
147 449 U.S. at 389; 600 F.2d at 1227 n.12.
14" 449 U.S. at 396-97, 402.
149 Id. at 386.
150 In applying Upjohn, the lower federal courts have adopted a
number of different approaches. See generally 24 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT &
KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 5483 (2d ed.
1986). For discussion and comparison of the control group and subject
matter tests, see RICE, supra note 119, §§ 4.13-.14.
151 See Carole Basri, Confidentiality of Corporate Communications, in
CORPORATE COMPLIANCE 2001, at 181, 185 (PLI Corporate Law and
Practice Course, Handbook Series No. 1249, 2001).
152 449 U.S. at 392.
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go to lawyers to find out how to obey the law,"' 153 because
corporate legal compliance "is hardly an instinctive
matter."'54 The Court further stated:
[tihe narrow scope given the attorney-client privilege
by the court below not only makes it difficult for
corporate attorneys to formulate sound advice when
their client is faced with a specific legal problem, but
also threatens to limit the valuable efforts of
corporate counsel to ensure their client's compliance
with the law.'55
In particular, the Court observed:
if the purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to be
served, the attorney and client must be able to
predict with some degree of certainty whether
particular discussions will be protected. An
uncertain privilege, or one which purports to be
certain but results in widely varying applications by
the courts, is little better than no privilege at all.156
Rejecting the government's argument that risk of liability
alone would ensure that corporations would seek legal
advice, the Court stated that the government's position
"ignore[d] the fact that the depth and quality of any
investigations to ensure compliance with the law would
suffer, even were they undertaken.""7  The Court held the
attorney-client privilege applicable on grounds that "[t]he
communications at issue were made by Upjohn employees to
counsel for Upjohn acting as such, at the direction of
corporate supervisors in order to secure legal advice from
counsel,"15 and the communications concerned matters
within the scope of the employees' corporate duties.'5 9
... Id. (quoting Bryson P. Burnham, The Attorney-Client Privilege in
the Corporate Arena, 24 Bus. LAW 901, 913 (1969)).
154 449 U.S. at 392.
155 Id.
156 Id. at 393.
157 Id. at 393 n.2.




The Court noted that the work-product doctrine,
originally set forth in its 1947 decision in Hickman v.
Taylor,'160 had since been reaffirmed in United States v.
Nobles,'6 1 and incorporated into Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 26(b)(3).162 The Court emphasized the underlying
policy that "it is essential that a lawyer work with a certain
degree of privacy, "163 reiterating its admonition in Hickman v.
Taylor' that:
if discovery of the material sought were permitted
"much of what is now put down in writing would
remain unwritten. An attorney's thoughts,
heretofore inviolate, would not be his own.
Inefficiency, unfairness and sharp practices would
inevitably develop in the giving of legal advice and in
the preparation of cases for trial. The effect on the
legal profession would be demoralizing. And the
interests of the clients and the cause of justice would
be poorly served.'
161
The Court also pointed to the distinction in categories of
work product set forth in Rule 26(b)(3) and stressed the need
to accord special protection against disclosure of the mental
impressions, conclusions, opinions or legal theories of
counsel concerning litigation.1
66
In subsequent cases, although the Court has permitted
some exceptions to the attorney-client and work-product
privileges, it has continued to affirm the availability of these
protections to corporations.167 While the lower federal courts
160 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
161 422 U.S. 225, 236-40 (1975).
162 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
163 449 U.S. at 397-98.
164 329 U.S. at 511.
165 449 U.S. at 398 (quoting 329 U.S. at 511).
166 Id. at 400.
167 See RICE, supra note 119, § 4:14; JOHN K. VILLA, CORPORATE
COUNSEL GUIDELINES § 1.03, at 1-23, 1-24 nn.26-28 (1999). For a review of
Supreme Court cases addressing the applicability of the attorney-client
privilege, see Brian Sheppard, Views of the United States Supreme Court
as to Attorney-Client Privilege, 159 A.L.R. FED. 243 (2000). For discussion
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have had difficulty interpreting and applying Upjohn,68
when investigating counsel conduct the inquiry
appropriately, it is clear that both privileges apply to the
fruits of internal investigations. 169 A number of state courts,
though not bound by Upjohn with respect to state privilege
rules, have followed the Supreme Court's lead, while others
continue to apply the control group or subject matter tests in
matters governed by state law. 170
Since the Supreme Court decided Upjohn in 1981, some
jurisdictions have also recognized a "self-evaluative"
privilege that protects an entity's internal efforts to discover
and analysis of the application of the attorney-client and work-product
privileges in the corporate context, see, for example, Alexander C. Black,
What Corporate Communications Are Entitled to Attorney-Client Privilege,
26 A.L.R. 5TH 628 (1995); BLACK, supra note 26, §§ 6.01-.02; John F.
Savarese and Carol Miller, Protecting Privilege and Dealing Fairly with
Employees While Conducting An Internal Investigation, in CRISIS
MANAGEMENT & BUSINESS RECOVERY: ARE YOU PREPARED?, at 63, 69-86
(PLI Corporate Law and Practice Course, Handbook Series No. 1296,
2000). For a comparative analysis of the applicability of the privilege with
respect to the work of in-house corporate counsel, see VILLA, supra, §§
1.01-.28.
168 Basri, supra note 151, at 186-88. See generally Nancy Horton
Burke, The Price of Cooperating with the Government: Possible Waiver of
Attorney-Client and Work Product Privileges, 49 BAYLOR L. REV. 33 (1997).
One of the most significant developments in the post-Upjohn era is the
development of the law with respect to the relationship of voluntary
disclosure to continued assertion of the attorney-client and work-product
privileges. The seminal case is the Third Circuit's decision in
Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Republic of the Philippines, 951 F.2d 1414
(3d Cir. 1991). See generally Burke, supra, at 33 ("'While [voluntary]
disclosure might help the private party to resolve its differences with the
government, that party must be mindful that a court may order the
disclosure of this otherwise privileged information to third-party civil
litigants seeking to take advantage of the investigative work of the party
and/or its legal counsel."); Alec Koch, Internal Corporate Investigations:
The Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege and Work-Product Protection
Through Voluntary Disclosures to the Government, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
347 (1997).
169 See RICE, supra note 119, § 4:14 (attorney-client and work-product
privileges); VILLA, supra note 167, § 1.22 (attorney-client privilege).
170 See Basri, supra note 151, at 186.
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and remedy misconduct.'71 The self-evaluative privilege
affords valuable protection in jurisdictions where it is
available to companies conducting internal investigations. It
is not widely recognized in the context of criminal
investigations however.
17 2
B. An End-run Around Upjohn: Privilege Waivers as
the Price of Cooperation with the Federal
Government
1. Recent Trends in Federal Sentencing of
Corporate Defendants
As the risks of corporate criminal and civil liability began
to increase, and the potentially staggering consequences
became clear, 1 more and more corporate defendants chose
to settle with the government rather than litigate. From
1997 to 2000, close to ninety percent of all corporate
defendants in federal criminal proceedings pled guilty;174 by
2001 the number had climbed to nearly ninety-three
percent.175  The United States Sentencing Commission's
Organizational Sentencing Guidelines76 have encouraged
this trend. The Guidelines permit a corporation facing
sentencing proceedings to lower its culpability score by
showing that at the time the offense occurred the company
had in place an "effective program to prevent and detect
171 See BLACK, supra note 26, § 6.03; McLaughlin & McCarthy, supra
note 10, at 998-99; VILLA, supra note 167, § 1.18; James S. Bolan,
Attorney-Client Privilege for In-House Counsel "Advocats Avec Frontiers,"
in LEGAL PROBLEMS OF MUSEUM ADMINISTRATION, at 217, 237 (Am. Law
Inst.-Am. Bar. Ass'n Course of Study, No. SE61, 2000); Savarese & Miller,
supra note 167, at 95-97.
172 See BLACK, supra note 26, § 6.03; Savarese & Miller, supra note
167, at 95.
173 See supra note 75 and text accompanying notes 66-98.
174 Cloherty et al., supra note 15, at n.6 (citing USSC statistics).
175 Id.
176 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8 (2002).
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violations of the law," 177 or by demonstrating "[sielf-
reporting, cooperation, and acceptance of responsibility" for
the organization's wrongful conduct.178
As a recent article points out, the Organizational
Sentencing Guidelines have not yet evolved in the same
fashion as those applicable to individuals.'79  Not
surprisingly, there are far fewer prosecutions of corporations
than of individuals' 5 0-the relative numbers of each
guarantee that this will always be the case. Nevertheless,
the Sentencing Commission's data shed light on the
invocation of these standards. For example, the concept of
corporate compliance programs highlighted by the
Guidelines has received considerable fanfare.' Compliance
programs of various sorts have become standard practice-
outpaced only by the exponentially expanding number of
"experts" from consultants, accounting companies, and law
177 Id. § 8C2.5(f). Pursuant to the U.S.S.G., an effective compliance
program requires seven key elements: (1) compliance standards and
procedures for employees that are reasonably capable of reducing the
possibility of criminal misconduct; (2) assignment of overall compliance
responsibility to high-level personnel in the organization; (3) use of due
care to avoid delegating substantial discretionary authority to persons the
organization knows, or should know, have a propensity to engage in illegal
activity; (4) effective communication of compliance standards and
procedures to all employees; (5) putting in place monitoring and auditing
systems designed to detect criminal conduct, along with a highly
publicized reporting system that employees know they can utilize without
fear of retribution; (6) consistent enforcement of compliance standards,
including discipline of offenders and responsible persons who fail to detect
offenses; and (7) appropriate responses to offenses detected, including
steps to prevent similar offenses. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §
8A1.2, application note 3(k) (2002).
178 Id. § 8C2.5(g).
... Cloherty et al., supra note 15, at text accompanying note 4 (noting
the absence of judicial decisions analyzing the applicability of sentencing
criteria to corporate defendants in contrast to the number of cases
interpreting application of the U.S.S.G. to the sentencing of individuals).
180 Id.
' See id. at note 3 and accompanying text.
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firms who offer their services to design and help implement
these programs. 82
Significantly, while compliance programs are
undoubtedly of value in preventing misconduct and dealing
promptly with wrongdoing when it does occur, it is very clear
that it is difficult to design and implement a compliance
program that will merit credit under the Guidelines. From
1995 to 1999, only two of 496 corporate defendants sentenced
under the Guidelines received credit for having an effective
compliance program in place,183  while none received
compliance program credit in 2000.184 In contrast, in 2000
more than eighty-five percent of corporations received credit
for cooperation and/or acceptance of responsibility. 8 5  As
these data demonstrate, the best opportunity for
organizations to reduce criminal sanctions may well lie in
the areas of "cooperation" and "corporate acceptance of
responsibility" for misconduct.
While the United States Sentencing Commission sets the
applicable standards, it is federal prosecutors who assess
corporate cooperation and acceptance of responsibility, and it
is primarily prosecutors who inform the federal courts on
these issues. It is also prosecutors, in conjunction with the
federal agency enforcement personnel, who make the
threshold decision whether to charge corporations and/or the
individuals who manage and work for them.
182 Hundreds of advertisements for corporate compliance consultants
and related services are readily available through the Internet and a wide
variety of legal and accounting publications. See, e.g., Directory of
Consultants, Consultants-Corporate Compliance & Audits, at
http://www.hospiceresources.net/consultantcorporatecomplianceprograms
(last visited Oct. 18, 2003).
183 Cloherty et al., supra note 15, at text accompanying note 29.
184 Id.
185 Id. at text accompanying note 32.
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2. DOJ's Federal Prosecution of Business
Organizations
The DOJ's Federal Prosecution of Business
Organizations186  provides guidance to assist federal
prosecutors in making charging, plea negotiation and
sentencing position decisions with respect to corporations
and other business organizations.
An earlier version of these principles, prepared by an ad
hoc interagency working group spearheaded by the DOJ,
first appeared in 1999 as an attachment to a memorandum
from then-Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder to United
States Attorneys emphasizing the DOJ's commitment to
prosecution of corporate offenders. 87 These principles, now
incorporated into the United States Attorneys' Manual,'88 and
most recently amended in January 2003,1"9 clearly set forth
the relevance of privilege waivers and corporate cooperation
to the threshold decision whether to bring charges against
corporate defendants, as well as determinations whether to
grant amnesty or immunity to parties involved in
government investigations. As the policy states:
In determining whether to charge a corporation, that
corporation's timely and voluntary disclosure of
wrongdoing and its willingness to cooperate with the
government's investigation may be relevant factors.
In gauging cooperation, prosecutors should consider
the corporation's willingness to identify the culprits
within the corporation, including senior executives,
to make witnesses available, to disclose the complete
results of its internal investigation, and to waive the
attorney-client and work-product privileges.' 90
18 Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations, supra note 22.
187 Memorandum from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Deputy Attorney General,
on Bringing Criminal Charges Against Corporations (June 16, 1999), at
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/policy/Chargingcorps.html (last
visited Oct. 22, 2003) [hereinafter Holder Memorandum].
188 Id.
18' Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations, supra note 22.
190 Id. pt. III cmt.
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In connection with sentencing, the policy goes on to
explain:
One factor the prosecutor may weigh in assessing the
adequacy of a corporation's cooperation is the
completeness of its disclosure including, if necessary,
a waiver of the attorney-client and work product
protections, both with respect to its internal
investigation and with respect to communications
between specific officers, directors, and employees
and counsel.'91
The DOJ takes a similar position with respect to
consideration of the effectiveness of corporate compliance
programs, and negotiation of plea agreements. 192 Given the
high incidence of corporate guilty pleas,'93 the latter context
is particularly important. With respect to plea negotiations,
the policy instructs: "in plea agreements in which the
corporation agrees to cooperate, the prosecutor should
ensure that the cooperation is complete and truthful."1 94 To
do so, among other things, "the prosecutor may request that
the corporation waive attorney-client and work-product
protection, make employees and agents available for
191 Id. pt. VI cmt. The policy states that DOJ does not "consider waiver
of a corporation's privileges an absolute requirement," but "only one factor
in evaluating the corporation's cooperation." Id. Nevertheless, it is clearly
a very important one. As one commentator notes, "More often than not, a
company under investigation for alleged environmental violations is
inclined to cooperate with the agencies conducting the investigation. This
reflexive response may arise from several sources, including a fear of
stimulating further investigation, a concern about disbarment or
suspension from government contracts or loss of a license, the desire to
avoid adverse publicity and/or the natural tendency to view one's own
company as a 'good corporate citizen' with nothing to hide." Marshall,
supra note 103, at 27-28.
192 Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations, supra note 22, pt.
XII cmt.
193 See supra text accompanying notes 68-71.
194 Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations, supra note 22, pt.
XII cmt.
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debriefing, [and] disclose the results of its internal
investigation . ".."195
The policy cautions that prosecutors "generally should not
agree to accept a corporate guilty plea in exchange for non-
prosecution or dismissal of charges against individual
officers and employees." 96 It instructs prosecutors deciding
whether to charge corporations to consider not only an
organization's "willingness to cooperate in the investigation
of its agents,"197 but "whether [a] corporation appears to be
protecting its culpable employees and agents."'98 Prosecutors
should factor into their calculus "a corporation's promise of
support to culpable employees and agents, either through the
advancing of attorneys' fees, through retaining the employees
without sanction for their misconduct, or through providing
information to the employees about the government's
investigation pursuant to a joint defense agreement . "..."199
Inherent in this calculus is a sweeping pronouncement:
corporate engagement in joint defense agreements, failure to
sanction employees (whether or not they have been convicted
of a crime), and advancement of attorneys' fees may all be
grounds for deeming corporations uncooperative.200
The defense bar has repeatedly raised concerns about
these policies, but with little effect to date. For example, at a
March 2003 conference of the American Bar Association's
Criminal Defense Section, defense attorneys related
encountering "'unprecedented pressures' to cooperate and
waive the privilege,"20' and experiencing first-hand "the
195 Id.
196 Id.
197 Id. pt. XII.
198 Id. pt. VI.
199 Id. (emphasis supplied). "[Olverly broad assertions of corporate
representation of employees or former employees" may also be viewed as
"conduct that impedes the investigation." Id.
200 Id. The policy excepts advancement of counsel fees required by
state law. Id. pt. II n. 4.
201 Criminal Law-White Collar Crime: Programs Examine Trend
Toward Seeking Corporate Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege, 71
U.S.L.W. 2625, 2635 (2003) [hereinafter White Collar Crime]. See also,
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government's policy of viewing a corporation's payment of
employees' legal fees as a sign of lack of cooperation."2"2 In
the words of one criminal defense lawyer, "the attorney-
client privilege is under siege."0 3  Federal prosecutors
responded that "waivers are requested, not demanded[;]
waiver is a strategic decision."204  One Assistant United
States Attorney commented that a corporate decision to
waive the protection of the attorney-client and work-product
privileges is comparable to an individual's decision to waive
Fifth Amendment rights pursuant to a plea bargain."2 5 She
contended that tying acknowledgment of cooperation to a
corporation's agreement to waive its attorney-client and
work-product privileges is "simply a tool in the government's
arsenal."2 6 Defense counsel are inclined to take a different
view: "Prosecutors .. .expect the corporation's lawyers to
conduct an investigation for the government with tools the
government does not have, particularly the threat of firing
employees who refuse to provide information."2 7
Various kinds of cooperation may also significantly
impact enforcement action decisions by agencies such as the
e.g., Richard Ben-Veniste & Lee H. Rubin, DOJ Reaffirms and Expands
Aggressive Corporate Cooperation Guidelines, LEGAL BACKGROUNDER, Apr.
4, 2003, at 1; Thomas F. Carlucci et. al., CONDUCTING CORPORATE INTERNAL
INVESTIGATIONS, in A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO INTERNAL CORPORATE
INVESTIGATIONS, at 36 (D.C. Bar Continuing Legal Education Program,
2002) (copy on file with author); David M. Zornow & Keith D. Krakaur, On
the Brink of a Brave New World: The Death of Privilege in Corporate
Criminal Investigations, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 147, 154-56 (2000).
202 White Collar Crime, supra note 201, at 2635.
203 White Collar Crime, supra note 201, at 2635; see also Zornow &
Krakaur, supra note 206, at 155.
"o White Collar Crime, supra note 201, at 2635; see also Zornow &
Krakaur, supra note 206, at 155.
205 White Collar Crime, supra note 201, at 2635.
206 Id.
207 Id. Some members of the defense bar argue that DOJ's corporate
cooperation policies are undermining the DOJ's own objectives by making
it more difficult for organizations to conduct internal investigations and
thereby restricting the flow of information to the government over the long
term. Ben-Veniste & Rubin, supra note 201, at 4.
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SEC, the Department of Defense, the Environmental
Protection Agency, and the Department of Health and
Human Services.208 While their guidelines do not require
privilege waivers or withholding of support for "culpable"
employees as criteria for participation in voluntary
disclosure programs, these agencies work hand in hand with
the DOJ and United States Attorneys' Offices around the
country. The DOJ's policies necessarily impact those of all of
its client agencies.
The approach to privilege issues advanced by the DOJ's
Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations severely
compromises counsel's ability to rely on the attorney-client
and work-product privileges to keep confidential any
materials gathered, notes taken, or memoranda written in
the course of an internal investigation. The government's
policy very effectively undermines the Supreme Court's
decision in Upjohn without the need for litigation. °9  In
consequence:
[olnce-celebrated goals of our legal system-the
client's rights of confidentiality and freedom from
self-incrimination-are giving way to the
government's powerful demands for the swift
disclosure of all evidence relevant to investigations of
corporate misconduct. With this change in
208 See Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations, supra note 22,
pt. VI. Information pertaining to the Department of Defense's voluntary
disclosure program is available at http://www.dodig.osd.mil/
Inspections/IPO/vdpam.pdf (last visited Oct. 15, 2003); the Environmental
Protection Agency offers information on its program at
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/policies/incentives/auditing/final
polstate.pdf (last visited Oct. 15, 2003); and the parameters of the
Department of Health and Human Services' voluntary disclosure program
are set forth at Publication of the OIG's Provider Self-Disclosure Protocol,
63 Fed. Reg. 58,399 (Oct. 30, 1998). The SEC relies on an informal
approach. The Commission articulated relevant factors in a 2001 Report
of Investigation Pursuant to Sections 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 and Commision Statement on the Relationship of Cooperation to
Agency Enforcement Decisions, Exchange Act Release No. 44,969, Acct'g
and Audt'g Release No. 1470 (Oct. 23, 2001).
209 See Zornow & Krakaur, supra note 201, at 154-56.
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prosecutorial attitude, the government effectively is
deputizing "Corporate America" as an arm of law
enforcement at the expense of principles that lie at
the core of our adversarial system of justice. 10
Whether or not the public policy underlying the DOJ's
strategy is sound, there is no question that it has
dramatically affected the conduct of many internal
investigations and the use of their findings.
C. The Impact of Federal Corporate Cooperation
Policies on Individuals Interviewed in the Course of
Internal Investigations of Potential Criminal
Violations
1. Possible Loss of Fifth Amendment Protections
An employee asked to participate in an investigative
interview has little choice. Refusal to do so may result in
sanctions or even termination. In most states a refusal to
cooperate with an internal investigation "constitutes a
breach of an employee's duty of loyalty to the corporation
and is good grounds for terminating his employment."2 1
Until the late 1990s, the Supreme Court's Upjohn decision
provided some assurance for both corporations and their
constituents that internal investigations were truly
internal."2 The attorney-client privilege and work-product
doctrine protected the materials counsel prepared in the
course of their work, even if the corporation later engaged in
voluntary disclosure or pleaded guilty to a criminal offense.
That is no longer the case. In the current enforcement
environment, as noted earlier, more than ninety percent of
210 Id.
21' BLACK, supra note 26, § 4.03[2] (recommending entity consider
terminating employees who decline to be interviewed). See also Merrill,
supra note 108, at 113-15.
212 Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981); see supra text
accompanying notes 148-69.
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corporations charged with criminal offenses plead guilty,
13
and eighty-five percent of those companies sentenced
cooperate with the government in some fashion.214 Others
avoid prosecution through extensive voluntary disclosures
that may well include materials prepared in the course of
internal investigations; and still others have statutory
obligations to conduct internal investigations and disclose
the results.21 Consequently, if, in the course of an interview,
"an employee responds to the corporate attorney in a manner
which implicates him personally in criminal conduct, he may
have unknowingly lost the value of his fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination." 216  The risk that a
corporate employer will turn over memoranda and notes of
employee interviews to government authorities is not
insignificant. Once employees have made incriminating
statements to internal investigators, the privilege against
self-incrimination will not protect them.2 7 Moreover, in the
213 See supra text accompanying notes 68-71.
214 See supra text accompanying note 185.
215 See supra text accompanying notes 104-12. See generally Stacy L.
Brainin, Internal Investigations in Health Care: Unique Environment and
the Dilemma of Disclosure, in INTERNAL CORPORATE INVESTIGATIONS, supra
note 12, at 439-40; Michael Shepard, No Security: Internal Investigations
into Violations of the Securities Laws, in INTERNAL CORPORATE
INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 12, at 389, 395-404; Joseph F. Coyne &
Charles F. Barker, Employees' Rights and Duties During an Internal
Investigation, in INTERNAL CORPORATE INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 12, at
173; Holliday & Stevens, supra note 104, at 283-85.
216 Kathryn W. Tate, Lawyer Ethics and the Corporate Employee: Is the
Employee Owed More Protection Than the Model Rules Provide?, 23 IND. L.
REV. 1, 3-4 & n.6 (1990). Professor Tate focuses in particular on the
vulnerability of lower echelon employees asked to participate in internal
investigative interviews. She provides a comprehensive analysis of the
Model Rules applicable to interactions between counsel and client
employees, including issues pertaining to interviews, multiple
representation and referral client relationships. She offers specific
proposals for amendment of several Model Rules to mitigate employee
vulnerability in these contexts.
217 See, e.g., Tate, supra note 216, at 4; Bennett et al., supra note 48, at
47-48; Merrill, supra note 108, at 99-100, 114-115; Zornow & Krakaur,
supra note 201, at 153. A debate is beginning to emerge over whether
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current enforcement environment, individual corporate
actors are far more likely to spend time in jail than their
predecessors. 218
2. Disclosures that May Embarrass the Employee
or Superiors
In addition to the tension between sacrifice of
constitutional protections and the loss of livelihood,
employees may face intra-corporate political land mines,
particularly if what the employee says turns out to
embarrass the employee or her superiors. A hypothetical
may help to illustrate this point. Suppose, for example, that
lawyers conducting an internal investigation question a
Finance Department employee about questionable aspects of
a major transaction. The employee provides information
that reveals practices that are embarrassingly sloppy, but
not illegal. If the CFO subsequently receives this
information as part of counsel's report on investigative
findings, even a CFO with the best of intentions may have
difficulty treating the employee fairly after the investigation
concludes. Thus, whether or not investigating counsel finds
any significant problem with the transaction, the employee's
relationship with an important and powerful superior is
likely to suffer. It is also entirely possible that an
unrepresented employee involved in questionable conduct
may end up as a corporate scapegoat, particularly if the
employee essentially confesses to engaging in some form of
misconduct while a more culpable, but more legally
sophisticated superior, manages to remain silent. As one
internal corporate investigations required by statute can be considered
state action. See Turk, supra note 12, at 99.
218 See supra note 75 and text accompanying notes 75-86. For
example, an individual convicted of an antitrust violation "faces a greater
risk of jail time today than even a few years ago. Approximately 50
individual defendants were imprisoned for antitrust and related offenses
in FYs 1999 and 2000, which is more than the total number of individuals
imprisoned in the previous five years." Hammond, supra note 116, at 335.
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commentator points out, lower echelon employees are
particularly vulnerable to these kinds of problems. 19
3. Failure To Comprehend the Role of
Investigating Counsel
The risks to employees participating in internal
interviews are apparent when one considers the objectives
that corporate counsel are ethically required to pursue in
conducting such investigations.2 ° Counsel's first goal is to
determine whether wrongdoing has occurred. If it has, it is
in the corporation's best interest to show that an errant
employee or agent acted on her own without either corporate
encouragement or corporate authority. Consequently,
counsel must pursue evidence in support of this theory. Both
corporate representatives and counsel may sincerely believe
that the best way to promote the corporation's interests is to
find an explanation for the challenged conduct that does not
result in liability for either the organization or its
constituents, but this optimal outcome is often unrealistic.
Whenever this is the case, corporate counsel are ethically
bound to choose the interests of the corporation over those of
its constituents.2 1
The employee, however, may not realize his or her
potential vulnerability. A corporate constituent may know
and trust the lawyers conducting the interview and
misperceive their role in the investigation. While this may
be particularly true for lower echelon employees who lack
legal sophistication,222 even senior employees are at risk.223
21" Tate, supra note 216, at 8, 11.
220 See infra Part IV.A.2.(i); see also text accompanying notes 261-70.
221 Id.
222 See GEOFFREY HAZARD & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF
LAWYERING § 17.13, at 17-45 (2000 Supp.) (high officials may assume
company counsel is their counsel); CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL
ETHICS § 13.7, at 733 (1986) ("A principal might even come to think of the
corporation's lawyer as 'my' lawyer as well. That will occur particularly,
as is common, when their relationship is long-standing and developing
social as well as professional dimensions.").
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Although senior managers may be more savvy with respect
to legal matters, if the lawyers interviewing them are people
they deal with regularly, managers may respond on the basis
of existing personal connections without fully appreciating
the true nature of the circumstances.
4. Erroneous Expectations
In contrast, when the government approaches an
employee directly, the elements of mutual trust and
commitment are not present. Employees are far more likely
to realize the personal risks inherent in the situation, and
they have an opportunity to decline to participate without
fearing job loss. Contacts by government agents may
motivate employees to retain personal counsel or perhaps
even request immunity in exchange for cooperation. At a
minimum, if government agents interview an employee
suspected of illegal conduct, the individual is entitled to the
warnings constitutionally required by Miranda v. Arizona,22 4
a cautionary statement likely to put those questioned on
their guard.225 In fact, the absence of a Miranda warning in
an internal interview may well lull employees into believing
that they are not personally at risk. As Justice Rehnquist
wrote for the Court in Dickerson,226 "Miranda has become
embedded in routine police practice to the point where the
warnings have become part of our national culture."27
Employees at any level may have no idea that they are
providing information likely to go to federal prosecutors, or
that they may be forfeiting the Fifth Amendment's protection
against self-incrimination by providing information to
counsel conducting the interviews.
223 See, e.g., Tate, supra note 216, at 7-8. As Professor Tate points out,
an employee's loyalty and commitment to his or her employer may well
work against the employee's own best interests. Id. at 11-13.
224 384 U.S. 436 (1966) [hereinafter Miranda warnings].
221 Id. at 469. See infra note 349.
226 Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
227 Id. at 443.
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Consequently, the information attorneys conducting
internal investigations receive from their client's
constituents may be given because of an employee's sense of
duty or loyalty to her employer, her relationship to attorneys
she either knows or knows to be representing her employer,
or the absence of admonitions so commonly associated with
questioning that may lead to arrest or other law enforcement
consequences."' If the corporation subsequently waives the
attorney-client and work-product privileges with respect to
the investigation, prosecutors are likely to garner all kinds of
information-including potentially incriminating
statements-from people who might otherwise decline to
speak with prosecutors, FBI agents, or other government
investigators.
Of course, the attorney-client privilege belongs to the
corporation in this context, and it is possible to argue that
neither senior managers nor line employees ever had any
basis to expect that their statements would be kept
confidential. This is counterintuitive, however. There is no
reason to believe that employees at any level understand
without explanation that lawyers working for their
employer-especially lawyers with whom they have
developed a relationship of confidence and trust-may
readily metamorphose into de facto government agents.229
228 See Tate, supra note 217, at 9, 11-12; Zornow & Krakaur, supra
note 201, at 153.
229 The extent to which corporate employees perceive that this is so
steadily erodes employees' motivation to engage in discussions with
investigating counsel, despite the Supreme Court's Upjohn admonition
that "the best route to corporate compliance with the law is 'full and frank
communication between attorneys and their [corporate] clients."' Zornow
& Krakaur, supra note 201, at 148-49 (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United
States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981)); Koch, supra note 168, at 355 & n.38




D. The Consequences of Federal Corporate
Cooperation Policies for Organizations
Every day businesses across the country engage in efforts
to build employee loyalty.3 0 Loyalty is critical to worker
productivity, efficient operations and good customer
service.23' It depends on working conditions, compensation,
and job satisfaction. But loyalty is also a function of the
extent to which employees trust their employer and believe
that the employer is interested in the well-being of its
employees. Employees are unlikely to remain committed to
an employer they do not trust. Consequently, companies
spend a good deal of effort in team building and various
kinds of programs to foster commitment and reward loyalty
on the part of their employees.232 Consultants offer programs
for team-building; management gurus offer insights on
culture change; human resources professionals counsel
managers on building loyalty and commitment in their
departments; and every bookstore has an array of resources
on effective management techniques. In many ways, it is
apparent that the public, too, expects employers to be loyal
to their employees-plant closings or reductions in force are
far more often greeted with dismay and criticism than
210 See, e.g., An Alternative to Cocker Spaniels, ECONOMIST, Aug. 25,
2001 [hereinafter Cocker Spaniels]; Good Work (How Companies Manage
Finance Employees), CFO MAGAZINE, Sept. 1, 2000 [hereinafter Good
Work]; JAMES HESKETT ET AL., THE SERVICE PROFIT CHAIN: How LEADING
COMPANIES LINK PROFIT AND GROWTH TO LOYALTY, SATISFACTION AND VALUE
(1997); DENNIS G. MCCARTHY, THE LOYALTY LINK: How LOYAL EMPLOYEES
CREATE LOYAL CUSTOMERS (1997); THE QUEST FOR LOYALTY: CREATING
VALUE THROUGH PARTNERSHIPS (Frederick F. Reicheld ed., 1996).
231 As Professor Tate suggests, however, employees' loyalty to their
employers may work against their own best interests in the internal
interview context See Tate, supra note 216, at 11-13.
232 See T. J. SCHIER, SEND FLOWERS TO THE LIVING! REWARDS,
CONTESTS AND INCENTIVES TO BUILD EMPLOYEE LOYALTY (2002); sources
cited supra note 231.
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admiration for the managers' savvy cost-cutting, profit-
maximizing policies.233
While few would suggest that protection of "culpable"
employees is appropriate, punishment or termination of an
employee simply because a third party-whether a co-
worker, prosecutor or agency-views that person as
"culpable" is difficult to square with basic notions of fairness.
The DOJ's current policies represent a well-intentioned
attempt to prevent continued employment of dishonest
employees and to thwart senior managers ready to sacrifice
the organization's well-being to save themselves, but they
sweep so broadly that anomalous results are sometimes
inevitable. While it may be reasonable to expect
organizations to disclose evidence of wrongdoing, it is hard to
defend a policy that calls for employers to jettison employees
on the basis of unproven allegations.
The policy against joint defense agreements discourages
organizations from cooperating with individuals in defending
against government charges. Perhaps most troubling of all,
however, is the DOJ's position that advancement of legal fees
to employees involved in criminal investigations evidences a
lack of corporate cooperation with the prosecution.
Corporate indemnification and fee advancement policies
manifest employer-employee loyalty by providing protection
against liability that may arise from actions undertaken in
the course of work on behalf of the organization.234
Indemnification and fee advancement are permitted by the
Model Business Corporations Act,235 the American Law
Institute Principles of Corporate Governance,236 courts, and
state corporate codes.23 7  For example, when a director
233 Michael Moore's classic film ROGER & ME (Dog Eat Dog Films
1989) vividly illustrates this point with respect to the closing of obsolete
General Motors plants in Flint, Michigan.
... See generally ALAN R. PALMITER, CORPORATIONS: EXAMPLES &
EXPLANATIONS 251 (4th ed. 1999).
235 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT §§ 8.51-8.56 (1984).
236 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 95, § 7.20.
237 See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 317 (West 2003); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 145 (2003); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 721-26 (McKinney 2003). See
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successfully defends an action against her on the merits,
indemnification is mandatory under all state corporate
laws.238  Even when the director is unsuccessful,
indemnification is generally discretionary if the director
acted in good faith, reasonably believed that she acted in the
best interests of the corporation, and parties other than the
corporation's own shareholders initiated the action.239 In
criminal prosecutions, indemnification is generally
permissible if the director did not have reasonable cause to
believe that her actions violated the law.24° These same
principles apply to the indemnification of officers and other
employees, except that employees who are neither officers
nor directors are unlikely to be entitled to mandatory
indemnification by statute."1
In light of the law of indemnification, many states also
permit corporations to advance legal fees242 if the recipient
executes an undertaking to repay these advances if he is
ultimately found not to be entitled to them.243 In addition,
officers, directors and employees in senior positions or with
special responsibilities often have a contractual right to both
indemnification and fee advancement. 44 In other cases, the
corporation's articles or bylaws may afford such rights,245 or
generally PALMITER, supra note 234, § 15.1, at 253-54. In many states
corporations may also purchase directors' and officers' insurance policies
affording protection broader than that which corporations may provide
pursuant to indemnification provisions. See, e.g., MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT
§ 8.57 (1984); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(g) (2003).
238 PALMITER, supra note 234, § 15.1, at 252.
239 Id.
240 See, e.g., MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.51(a)(3) (1984); PALMITER,
supra note 234, § 15.2, at 253-54.
241 See PALMITER, supra note 234, at 252.
242 Id. at 255. See, e.g., MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.53 (1984).
243 PALMITER, supra note 234, at 255. Professor Palmiter notes the
possibility that fee advancement might be viewed as an impermissible
loan in some circumstances pursuant to § 402 of Sarbanes-Oxley. Id.
244 Id. at 252.
" Id. Some state corporate codes limit indemnification and fee
advancement benefits to those provided by statute, but others permit
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the company's directors' and officers' insurance policies may
also provide them.246
The DOJ's corporate cooperation guidelines undermine
the very policies state corporate laws attempt to promote
through their indemnification and fee advancement
provisions. This is particularly true with respect to lower
level employees who are far less likely than senior managers
to have a contractual right to indemnification or fee
advancement. The DOJ's policies create incentives for
corporate employers to abandon employees on the basis of
mere accusations long before most of these allegations have
either been admitted as true or proven in a court of law.247
IV. CURRENT STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY APPLICABLE TO
INVESTIGATIVE INTERVIEWS OF CORPORATE
EMPLOYEES
Most jurisdictions base the professional responsibility
standards governing attorneys on the Model Rules.248 While
all of the rules work together to establish a framework for
ethical lawyering practices, Model Rules 1.3, 1.13, and 4.1
through 4.4 are particularly relevant to the conduct of
employee interviews in the context of an internal
investigation. Model Rule 3.8 is important because it
addresses the special responsibilities of prosecutors. A
review of these provisions, including discussion of post-
Sarbanes-Oxley revisions to Model Rule 1.13, follows.
corporations to extend broader rights to their officers, directors and
employees. Id.
246 PALMITER, supra note 234, § 15.2, at 255-56.
247 As Zornow and Krakaur observe, these policies are driving "a
wedge... between senior managers and other employees as corporations
rush to meet the requests of federal prosecutors for 'cooperation."' Zornow
& Krakaur, supra note 201, at 147.
248 See RONALD A. ROTUNDA, LEGAL ETHICS: THE LAWYER'S DESKBOOK
ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, § 1-1, at 8 (2000); HAZARD & HODES,
supra note 222, § 1.13, at 1-23. This discussion focuses on the relevant
Model Rules, with references to particularly relevant provisions of the
earlier Model Code of Professional Responsibility ("Model Code").
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A. Model Rules Provisions Relevant to Employee
Interviews and Related Prosecutorial Corporate
Cooperation Policies
1. Model Rule 1.3
Model Rule 1.3 mandates: "A lawyer shall act with
reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a
client."249 Comment 1 explains:
A lawyer should pursue a matter on behalf of a client
despite opposition, obstruction or personal
inconvenience to the lawyer, and may take whatever
lawful and ethical measures are required to vindicate
a client's cause or endeavor. A lawyer must also act
with commitment and dedication to the interests of
the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client's
behalf.25°
The comment also contains an important caveat: "[a]
lawyer is not bound, however, to press for every advantage
that might be realized for a client. . . . A lawyer has
professional discretion in determining the means by which a
matter should be pursued."251
Diligent representation and zealous advocacy are
fundamental to the practice of law. Few lawyers would
disagree that diligence and zeal are essential attributes of
effective representation. The current Model Rule is rooted in
related provisions of the earlier Model Code: Disciplinary
Rule 7-101(A)(1)-a lawyer "shall not intentionally ... fail to
seek the lawful objectives of his client"252-and Canon 7-"A
lawyer should represent a client zealously within the bounds
of the law."253 On its face, Model Rule 1.3 seems neither
249 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3 (2003).
250 Id. R. 1.3 cmt. 1.
251 Id.
252 MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-101(A)(1) (1980). See
ROTUNDA, supra note 248, at 80.
253 MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (1980). See
ROTUNDA, supra note 248, at 80.
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conceptually difficult nor hard to implement. "Lawyers are
agents of their clients and are therefore obligated to serve
client interests loyally and effectively."254 The meaning of
diligence and zeal, however, almost always depends on
context,255 and in some situations the appropriate boundaries
can be difficult to discern. Counsel representing a
corporation in conducting an internal investigation face a
particularly difficult situation, in part because of the nature
of their client as defined in Model Rule 1.13.
2. Model Rule 1.13
Model Rule 1.13 governs lawyers' obligations to
organizational clients. Recent corporate scandals and
concomitant criticism of the failure of corporate counsel to
prevent these problems has focused considerable attention
on the components of Model Rule 1.13, particularly with
respect to lawyers' obligations when corporate clients engage
in wrongdoing or fail to deal with organizational misconduct.
On August 12, 2003, the ABA House of Delegates adopted
major substantive revisions to parts of the rule as well as to
Model Rule 1.6, the standard governing the confidentiality of
information relating to the representation of a client.56 This
discussion addresses the newly adopted version of Model
Rule 1.13.
(i) Section 1.13(a)
Section (a) of Model Rule 1.13, unchanged by the recent
amendments, describes the overall principle applicable to
corporate representation: "A lawyer employed or retained by
an organization represents the organization acting through
254 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 222, § 6.3, at 6-7.
255 Cf id. § 6.3, 6-8 ("Contextual detail colors every situation in which
a lawyer is alleged to have fallen short.")
216 See ABA Adopts New Lawyer Ethics Rules, supra note 17. Redline
versions of amended Rules 1.6 and 1.13 are available at
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/red-rulel-13.pdf and http://www.abanet.
org/cpr/mprc/red-rulel-6.pdf.
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its duly authorized constituents." '257 Comment 1 explains the
concept of the entity as client:
An organizational client is a legal entity, but it
cannot act except through its officers, directors,
employees, shareholders and other constituents.
Officers, directors, employees and shareholders are
the constituents of the corporate organizational
client. . . . "Other constituents" . . . means the
positions equivalent to officers, directors, employees
and shareholders held by persons acting for
organizational clients that are not corporations.25
Comment 2 deals with the confidentiality of information
exchanged by counsel and client constituents, incorporating
the principle of Upjohn and the protections of Model Rule
1.6259: "When one of the constituents of an organizational
client communicates directly with the organization's lawyer
in that person's organizational capacity, the communication
is protected by Model Rule 1.6.' '260
257 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(a) (2003).
258 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13 cmt. 1 (2003). "The duties
defined in [comment 7] apply equally to unincorporated associations." Id.
259 Model Rule 1.6 addresses the confidentiality of attorney-client
communications. The August 2003 amendments to Rule 1.6 do not alter a
lawyer's fundamental duty to maintain client confidences, but the changes
add two new grounds to existing exceptions related to fraud and
substantial financial inquiry. See ABA Adopts New Lawyer Ethics Rules,
supra note 17.
260 The full text of comment 2 provides the following guidance:
When one of the constituents of an organizational client
communicates directly with the organization's lawyer in
that person's organizational capacity, the communication is
protected by Rule 1.6. Thus, by way of example, if an
organizational client requests its lawyer to investigate
allegations of wrongdoing, interviews made in the course of
that investigation between the lawyer and the client's
employees or other constituents are covered by Rule 1.6
[confidentiality of attorney-client communications]. This
does not mean, however, that constituents of an
organizational client are the clients of the lawyer.
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As both section 1.13(a) and comments 1 and 2 make clear,
Model Rule 1.13 rests on the entity theory of the
corporation.261 The entity theory is the concept underlying
most modern substantive corporate law,262 including the
Supreme Court's Upjohn ruling.263  Sarbanes-Oxley has
ensconced this principle in federal law.264 In contrast to
earlier concepts of the corporation as an aggregation of
individuals or a nexus of contracts,265 the entity theory
ascribes a separate existence to the organization itself
266
The first professional code adopted by the ABA, the Canons
of Professional Ethics, did not refer to corporations.267 In
1970, however, the Model Code incorporated the entity
theory into Ethical Consideration 5-18:
[A] lawyer employed or retained by a corporation or
similar entity owes his allegiance to the entity and
not to a stockholder, director, officer, employee,
representative, or other person connected with the
entity. In advising the entity, a lawyer should keep
paramount its interests, and his professional
judgment should not be influenced by the personal
desires of any person or organization. Occasionally,
a lawyer for an entity is requested by a stockholder,
261 See, e.g., HAZARD & HODES, supra note 222, § 17.3; James R.
McCall, The Corporation as Client: Problems, Perspectives, and Partial
Solutions, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 623, 626 (1988); Susanna M. Kim, Dual
Identities and Dueling Obligations: Preserving Independence in Corporate
Representation, 68 TENN. L. REV. 179, 188-93 (2001); WOLFRAM, supra note
222, § 13.7.2, at 732 (1986). For a discussion of the entity theory and other
current and historical legal concepts of the corporation, see David Millon,
Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201.
262 See McCall, supra note 261, at 267; cf MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 3.02
(1984) (setting forth infinite duration and general powers of business
corporations).
263 See supra text accompanying notes 135-70.
" Sarbanes-Oxley "reminds attorneys of their ethical obligations of
fidelity and loyalty owed to the corporate client, and not to [its] individual
constituents." Fox, supra note 86, at 898.
26 See, e.g., Millon, supra note 261, at 201.
266 Kim, supra note 261, at 190-93; Millon, supra note 262, at 206.
267 See McCall, supra note 261, at 627.
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director, officer, employee, representative, or other
person connected with the entity to represent him in
an individual capacity; in such case the lawyer may
serve the individual only if the lawyer is convinced
that differing interests are not present.268
The Model Rules and the Model Code thus share the
same basic premise with respect to representation of
corporate entities. This personification of the corporation is
an outgrowth of the development of the Anglo-American
tradition and its focus on both individual liberty and
individual responsibility. 269 The notion of the corporation as
an artificial person is also evident in other legal contexts-
for example, laws permitting corporations to sue and be
sued, as well as constitutional protections corporations can
claim in some circumstances.27 °
(ii) Section 1.13(b)
The remaining provisions of Model Rule 1.13 and the
accompanying comments attempt to guide counsel
representing corporations through the difficult terrain often
encountered in distinguishing between the artificial person
that is the client entity and those who act on its behalf. The
first of these provisions, section 1.13(b), emerged as a central
focus of the post-Enron controversy over counsel's obligations
to corporate clients in situations involving wrongdoing by an
organization's constituents. Section 1.13(b) addresses the
responsibility of counsel when the lawyer has knowledge of
constituent misconduct that may be imputable to the
organization and is likely to result in substantial injury to it.
268 MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-18 (1980).
269 Tate, supra note 216, at 8 n.31. For a discussion of the evolution of
the rule and the concepts supporting it, see McCall, supra note 261, at
627-36.
270 Corporations, for example, can bring suit under the "dormant
commerce clause," although they cannot claim the protections of the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of article IV, section 2 of the United
States Constitution. EDWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 446 (2d ed. 2002).
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Following Enron's collapse, pressure mounted to clarify and
strengthen the responsibilities of lawyers in these situations.
Congress provided a substantial impetus for change in
Sarbanes-Oxley. Section 307 of Sarbanes-Oxley specifically
addresses attorney conduct.271  It requires the SEC to
promulgate rules governing the professional conduct of
lawyers who appear and practice before the SEC.2 72 After a
heated public comment period, the SEC promulgated its final
Part 205 Rules on January 23, 2003.273 In relevant part the
new rules provide detailed guidelines for up-ladder reporting
of suspected corporate legal violations and the actions
counsel must take in the event that corporate authorities fail
to respond appropriately.274 On the same date, the SEC also
proposed rules requiring counsel to withdraw from
271 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) (2003). See supra note
86 and accompanying text.
272 See supra note 86 and accompanying text. Section 307 directs the
SEC to:
issue rules, in the public interest and for the protection of
investors, setting forth minimum standards of professional
conduct for attorneys appearing and practicing before the
Commission in any way in any representation of issuers,
including a rule -
(1) requiring an attorney to report evidence of a material
violation of securities law or breach of fiduciary duty or
similar violation by the company or any agent thereof, to
the chief legal counsel or the chief executive officer of the
company (or the equivalent thereof); and
(2) if the counsel or officer does not appropriately respond
to the evidence (adopting a necessary, appropriate
remedial measures or sanctions with respect to the
violation), requiring the attorney to report the evidence to
the audit committee of the board of directors of the issuer
or to another committee of the board of directors comprised
solely of directors not employed directly or indirectly by the
issuer, or to the board of directors.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, supra note 4, § 307.
273 17 C.F.R. § 205 (2003).
274 See supra note 86.
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representing a corporation in specified circumstances and
mandating reporting of counsel's withdrawal to the
Commission by the lawyer or the client. 5
While the SEC engaged in the rule-making required by
Sarbanes-Oxley, the legal profession itself focused on
addressing concerns about corporate governance and the role
of corporate counsel. In March 2002, the ABA established a
Task Force on Corporate Responsibility. 27 6 The Task Force
Report and its recommendations respond to allegations "that
through inaction, inattention, indifference, or, in some cases,
conflicting personal interests or loyalties," corporate lawyers,
as well as management, contributed to the corporate
misconduct that culminated in such devastating results. 7
In its July 2002 Preliminary Report, the Task Force
recommended reform of internal corporate governance
standards and amendment of the rules governing "the
professional conduct of lawyers."278 In March 2003, in its
Final Report,279 the Task Force offered three principal
proposals. Two of these recommendations dealt with the
Model Rules: the first with the client confidentiality
provisions of Model Rule 1.6 and the second with specific
components of Model Rule 1.13's provisions pertaining to
organizational clients. The third addressed corporate
275 Id.
276 Am. Bar Ass'n Task Force on Corporate Responsibility, Preliminary
Report of the American Bar Association Task Force on Corporate
Responsibility, 58 Bus. LAW 189 (2002), available at
http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/corporateresponsibility/home.html (last
visited Oct. 15, 2003). Robert Hirshorn, then president of the ABA,
charged the members of the Task Force to "examine the systematic issues
relating to corporate responsibility arising out of the unexpected and
traumatic bankruptcy of Enron and other Enron-like situations which
have shaken confidence in the effectiveness of the governance and
disclosure systems applicable to public companies in the United States."
Id.
277 Id. at 4-5.
278 Id. at 195, 208.
279 Report of the American Bar Association Task Force on Corporate
Responsibility (March 31, 2003), available at http://www.abanet.org/
buslaw/corporateresponsibility/final report.pdf.
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governance issues. As noted above, the ABA House of
Delegates adopted the Task Force proposals and amended
Model Rules 1.6 and 1.13 in August 2003.
The recent amendments to Model Rule 1.13 focus on
section 1.13(b) in an effort to specify the responses lawyers
representing organizational clients are to take upon learning
that a constituent "is engaged in action, intends to act or
refuses to act in a matter related to the representation that
is a violation of a legal obligation to the organization, or a
violation of law which reasonably might be imputed to the
organization, and that is likely to result in substantial injury
to the organization . ,,2'0 The additions included in the
amended rule stress the need to report problems up the
corporate ladder:
Unless the lawyer reasonably believes that it is not
necessarily in the best interest of the organization to
do so, the lawyer shall refer the matter to a higher
authority in the organization, including, if warranted
by the circumstances to the highest authority that
can act on behalf of the organization as determined
by applicable law.281
(iii) Sections 1.13(c), (d) and (e)
The other amendments to Model Rule 1.13, set forth in
sections 1.13(c), (d) and (e), augment the revisions to section
1.13(b). If the client's highest authority "insists upon or fails
to address in a timely and appropriate manner an action or a
refusal to act, that is clearly a violation of law," and "the
lawyer reasonably believes that the violation is reasonably
certain to result in substantial injury to the organization,"282
section 1.13(c) permits the lawyer to "reveal information
relating to the representation whether or not Model Rule 1.6
permits such disclosure, but only if and to the extent the
lawyer reasonably believes necessary to prevent substantial
210 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) (2003).
281 Id.
282 Id. R. 1.13(c).
[Vol. 2003
INTERNAL CORPORATE INVESTIGATIONS
injury to the organization."283 Section 1.13(e) requires a
lawyer who withdraws or is discharged from representation
of an entity as a result of actions pursuant to the disclosure
provisions of section 1.13(b) or 1.13(c) to "proceed as the
lawyer reasonably believes necessary to assure that the
organization's highest authority is informed of the lawyer's
discharge or withdrawal."
28 4
Section 1.13(d) creates an exception to the disclosure
provisions of sections 1.13(b) and (c) when the purpose for
which counsel is retained is to conduct an internal
investigation on behalf of an organizational client.28 5
(iv) Section 1.13(f)
Section 1.13(f) is the provision of the Model Rules most
directly relevant to employee interviews conducted as part of
an internal investigation. This section, previously
denominated 1.13(d), remained unchanged in the
amendment process. It provides: "In dealing with an
organization's directors, officers, employees, members,
shareholders or other constituents, a lawyer shall explain
the identity of the client when the lawyer knows or
reasonably should know that the organization's interests are
adverse to those of the constituents with whom the lawyer is
dealing."28 6 Comment 10287 further explains:
There are times when the organization's interest may
be or become adverse to those of one or more of its
283 Id. R. 1.3(e).
284 Id.
285 Section 1.13(d) provides:
Paragraph (c) shall not apply with respect to information
relating to a lawyer's representation of an organization to
investigate an alleged violation of law, or to defend the
organization or an officer, employee or other constituent
associated with the organization against a claim arising
out of an alleged violation of law.
Id. R. 1.13(d).
286 Id.
287 Previously denominated comment 7.
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constituents. In such circumstances the lawyer
should advise any constituent, whose interest the
ldwyer finds adverse to that of the organization of the
conflict or potential conflict of interest, that the
lawyer cannot represent such constituent, and that
such person may wish to obtain independent
representation. Care must be taken to assure that
the individual understands that, when there is such
adversity of interest, the lawyer for the organization
cannot provide legal representation for that
constituent individual, and that the discussions
between the lawyer for the organization and the
individual may not be privileged.28
Thus, the trigger for cautioning corporate constituents is
the lawyer's determination of adversity of interest. The
obligation to explain the identity of the lawyer's client and to
warn the employee with respect to privilege and
representation issues arises only if and when the lawyer
finds such adversity.
While both the Model Rules and the accompanying
comments offer guidance well beyond that provided by the
Model Code in this area, 289 they are still quite open-ended,
particularly in light of comment 11: "Whether such a
warning should be given by the lawyer for the organization
to any constituent individual may turn on the facts of each
case." 9' Thus, while adversity of interests triggers the need
for a warning, comment 11 makes it clear that the existence
of such adversity is a fact-specific question subject to the
determination of the investigating counsel. 291 As noted by
288 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13 cmt. 10 (2003) (emphasis
added).
289 See supra text accompanying note 268.
29' MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13 cmt. 11 (2003) (previously
denominated comment 8).
291 See supra text accompanying note 288. This duty "is actually quite
narrow and provides protection to an unrepresented entity constituent
that is quite skimpy." HAZARD & HODES, supra note 222, § 17.13, at 17-47.
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comment 6, however, counsel's statements are always
subject to the truthfulness requirement of Model Rule 4.1.292
The most significant limitation on counsel's conduct of the
interview arises not from Model Rule 1.13 itself, but from the
risk that a court may allow an interviewee to invoke the
attorney-client privilege on grounds that she believed that
the attorney represented her rather than or in addition to
the corporation. It is difficult, however, for an employee to
prevail on such a claim. 293
(v) Section 1.13(g)
Section 1.13(g), identical to the provision formerly
denominated 1.13(e), explains the circumstances in which
dual representation of a corporation and its constituents is
permissible in accordance with the conflict-of-interest
provisions of Model Rule 1.7.294 The provision notes that any
consent required from the entity may be given by "an
appropriate official other than the individual who is to be
represented, or by the shareholders. 295
3. Model Rules 4.1 through 4.4
Model Rules 4.1 through 4.4 govern a lawyer's dealings
with persons who are not her clients. Model Rule 4.1 sets
forth the fundamental requirement of truthfulness in dealing
292 In pertinent part, comment 6 provides as follows: "The authority
and responsibility in this Rule are concurrent with the authority and
responsibility provided in other Rules. In particular, this Rule does not
limit or expand the lawyer's responsibility under Rules 1.8, 1.16, 3.3 or
4.1." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13 cmt. 6 (2003). See supra
text accompanying notes 296-300.
293 See, e.g., Waggoner v. Snow, Becker, Kroll, Klaus & Krauss, 991
F.2d 1501 (9th Cir. 1993). See generally ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, supra note 20, at 227; Merrill, supra note 108, at
100; Tate, supra note 216, at 26-28. Professor Tate, however, does not
believe that this risk has had much impact on corporate counsel. See id. at
28.
29 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2003). See, e.g., Waggoner,
991 F.2d 1501.
295 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(g) (2003).
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with third parties in a manner substantially similar to the
earlier Code requirement.296 In pertinent part the rule states:
"In the course of representing a client, a lawyer shall not
knowingly: (a) make a false statement of material fact or law
to a third person."297 While comment 2 explains that not
every statement should be regarded as one of fact,298
referring to examples such as price estimates exchanged in
the course of negotiations,299 comment 1 states:
A lawyer is required to be truthful when dealing with
others on a client's behalf .... A misrepresentation
can occur if the lawyer incorporates or affirms a
statement of another person that the lawyer knows is
false. Misrepresentations can also occur by failure to
act. 0
Model Rules 4.2 and 4.3 specifically address counsel's
dealings with represented and unrepresented persons.
Model Rule 4.2 applies to persons "the lawyer knows to be
represented by another lawyer in the matter,"0 1 and it
prohibits communications with such persons without the
consent of their counsel, unless the communication is
otherwise authorized by law or by court order.0 2  In the
context of an internal investigation Model Rule 4.2 generally
requires a lawyer to refrain from interviewing a corporate
employee or agent who has retained his own counsel without
first obtaining counsel's consent.303
298 See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(5) (2003)
(in representing a client, "a lawyer shall not... [kinowingly make a false
statement of law or fact").
297 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.1(a) (2003).
29 Id. R. 4.1 cmt. 2.
299 Id.
300 Id. R. 4.1 cmt 1.
301 Id. R. 4.2 (2003).
302 Id. The Rule's language is also substantively similar to the
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 98(1) (2000).
303 This is the case unless the no-contact rule is trumped by "other
law," such as "a statute or a regulation authorized by statute, a
constitutional provision, or a judicial precedent." ROTUNDA, supra note
248, at 524 (citing MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.2 cmt. 1 (2003)).
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It is Model Rule 4.3, however, that relates most directly
to situations a lawyer is likely to encounter in the course of
an internal corporate investigation. Most corporate
constituents will not have their own counsel at the time they
are asked to participate in an investigative interview, and it
is the unrepresented individual who is most at risk. Unlike
Model Rule 1.13(f), Model Rule 4.3 is not designed
specifically to address internal corporate investigations.30 4 It
provides a point of comparison, however, and some
jurisdictions have utilized the rule as a basis for more
extensive requirements for internal investigations. Model
Rule 4.3 provides:
In dealing on behalf of a client with a person who is
not represented by counsel, a lawyer shall not state
or imply that the lawyer is disinterested. When the
lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the
unrepresented person misunderstands the lawyer's
role in the matter, the lawyer shall make reasonable
efforts to correct the misunderstanding. The lawyer
shall not give legal advice to an unrepresented
person, other than the advice to secure counsel, if the
lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the
interests of such a person are, or have a reasonable
possibility of being in conflict with the interests of
the client.
30 5
The rule is intended to ensure that a layperson will
understand the lawyer's position with respect to the
substantive issue so that the person can comprehend the
lawyer's role in the matter in question. 6 Model Rule 4.3
One notable exception occurs in grand jury proceedings in which
prosecutors question witnesses whose counsel are not present in the grand
jury room. See id. at 529. In the context of a corporation or other
organization, Rule 4.2 generally operates to prohibit contacts with persons
who have managerial responsibility or whose acts or omissions may be
imputed to the organization. Id. at 535.
'o4 See infra text accompanying note 309.
305 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.3 (2003).
306 ROTUNDA, supra note 248, § 33-1, at 542. The predecessor of Rule
4.3 is found in the Model Code to the effect that lawyers may not "[g]ive
No. 3:859] INTERNAL CORPORATE INVESTIGATIONS
arguably sets a higher standard than Model Rule 1.13(f)
requires with respect to informing corporate constituents of
the identity of counsel's client because there is no adversity
requirement; the trigger is the lawyer's perception that the
interviewee may be confused about her role. For this reason
one commentator argues that Model Rule 1.13(f) should
incorporate the potential confusion test of Model Rule 4.3
rather than the current adversity-of-interest standard. °7 On
the basis of Model Rule 4.3, some jurisdictions have created
a requirement that lawyers must fully disclose the identity of
their client to the interviewee in some contexts.3 08  For
example, in 1998 the District of Columbia Ethics
Commission concluded that in the course of an internal
investigation "a lawyer must advise [corporate constituents]
of his position as counsel to the corporation in the event of
any ambiguity in his role."39 However, Model Rule 4.3 itself
does not appear to require such disclosure, unless the lawyer
knows or reasonably should know that the interviewee
misunderstands the lawyer's role.
Model Rule 4.4(a) completes the Model Rules' provisions
governing lawyers' relationships with third parties. It
mandates: "In representing a client, a lawyer shall not use
advice to a person who is not represented by a lawyer, other than the
advice to secure counsel . . . ." MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR
7-104(A)(2). The Restatement also contains a similar provision in section
103. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 103 (2000).
The Restatement, however, prohibits misleading statements about the
lawyer's interest only if they would prejudice the third party, and it
requires correction of misstatements only if failure to do so would result in
prejudice to the non-client. Id. The Model Rule has led to problems of its
own because of a possible interpretation that the lawyer may give advice
once she has disclosed her interest. See HAZARD AND HODES, supra note
222, §§ 39-4 to 39-5.
307 See, e.g., Tate, supra note 216, at 60-62.
308 See, e.g., McCallum v. CSX Transp., Inc., 149 F.R.D. 104, 112-13
(M.D.N.C. 1993) (summarizing requirements imposed by North Carolina
and several courts with respect to interviews of current and former
employees of adverse parties).
309 D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 269 (1997) (emphasis added)
(disclosure required whenever corporation may take position adverse to
constituent's interests).
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means that have no substantial purpose other than to
embarrass, delay, or burden a third person, or use methods
of obtaining evidence that violate the legal rights of such a
person."31 ° The comment to the rule explains:
Responsibility to a client requires a lawyer to
subordinate the interests of others to those of the
client, but that responsibility does not imply that a
lawyer may disregard the rights of third persons. It
is impractical to catalogue all such rights, but they
include legal restrictions on methods of obtaining
evidence from third persons .... "'
Neither the rule nor the comment, however, discusses the
rights of a corporate constituent in an investigative
interview.
4. Model Rule 3.8
Model Rule 3.8 addresses "Special Responsibilities of a
Prosecutor."1 2 Its provisions encompass probable cause
requirements;313 reasonable efforts to ensure that the
accused is aware of the right to counsel, the procedure to
obtain counsel and the opportunity to do so;314 waiver of
rights by unrepresented persons;315 and disclosure of
exculpatory evidence.3 6 Comment 1 provides in relevant
part: "A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of
justice and not simply that of an advocate. This
responsibility carries with it specific obligations to see that
the defendant is accorded procedural justice and that guilt is
decided upon the basis of sufficient evidence." 317 One expert
notes: "It is often said that the duty of the public prosecutor
'is to seek justice, not merely to convict.' From this principle,
310 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.4(a) (2003).
311 Id. R. 4.4 cmt. 1.
312 Id. R. 3.8.
313 Id. R. 3.8(a).
314 Id. R. 3.8(b).
316 Id. R. 3.8(c).
316 Id. R. 3.8(d).
317 Id. R. 3.8 cmt. 1.
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there have developed certain limitations that modify the
duty of zealous behavior of government attorneys when they
are acting as prosecutors in criminal cases."31 8 As he further
explains, "some courts have stated that government lawyers,
even in civil cases, are under a higher standard than their
civil counterparts."319
For purposes of this inquiry, the pertinent portions of
Model Rule 3.8 are subsections (b) and (c):
The prosecutor in a criminal case shall:
(b) make reasonable efforts to assure that the
accused has been advised of the right to, and the
procedure for obtaining counsel and has been given
reasonable opportunity to obtain counsel;
(c) not seek to obtain from an unrepresented accused
a waiver of important pretrial rights, such as the
right to a preliminary hearing ....
These mandates reflect and build on constitutional
limitations on state actors in the criminal justice system,
particularly those set forth in Miranda v. Arizona320 and
recognized as "part of our culture" by the Supreme Court in
Dickerson v. United States.2 ' They require prosecutors "to
take a reasonably generous view of these matters, rather
than to extract every possible advantage from an
unrepresented person before counsel becomes available ...
includ[ing] efforts to assure that the police in the jurisdiction
318 ROTUNDA, supra note 248, at 501-02 (quoting MODEL CODE OF PROF'L
RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13 (1980) and citing MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (2003)).
311 Id. (citing Freeport-McMoRan Oil & Gas Co. v. Federal Energy
Regulatory Comm'n, 962 F.2d 45 (D.C. Cir. 1992)).
320 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). See infra text
accompanying note 356.
321 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000).
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respect a defendant's rights as well."322  The waiver
prohibition reflects efforts to limit coercion and to maximize
efficiency by precluding prosecutors from seeking waivers in
situations where they are unlikely to withstand judicial
scrutiny if challenged.
23
Model Rule 3.8 does not relate directly to either the
conduct of internal investigations or to subsequent
prosecutorial demands for materials relating to the
investigation. Nor does it specifically address prosecutorial
policies that seek to influence corporate behavior with
respect to advancement of attorneys' fees, employee
sanctions or joint defense agreements. The principles
established in subsections (b) and (c) are relevant however.
When prosecutors seek corporate privilege waivers, as the
United States Attorneys' Manual plainly states, these
"waivers permit the government to obtain statements of
possible witnesses, subjects,3 24 and targets,325 without having
322 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 222, at 34-7. See also STANDARDS
RELATING TO THE ADMIN. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 3-3.2(b) (1992):
A prosecutor shall advise a witness who is to be
interviewed of his or her rights against self-incrimination
and the right to counsel whenever the law so requires. It
is proper for a prosecutor to so advise a witness whenever
the prosecutor knows or has reason to believe that the
witness may be the subject of a criminal proceeding.
However, a prosecutor should not so advise a witness for
the purpose of influencing the witness in favor of or
against testifying.
s2 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 222, at 34-8.
324 The United States Attorneys' Manual defines a "subject" as "[a]
person whose conduct is within the scope of the grand jury's
investigation." U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-11.151
(2003).
325 A "target" is "a person as to whom the prosecutor or the grand jury
has substantial evidence linking him or her to the commission of a crime
and who, in the judgment of the prosecutor, is a putative defendant." Id.
However, the government does not automatically consider an officer or
employee of a target organization as an individual target "even if such
officer's or employee's conduct contributes to the commission of the crime
by a target organization." Id. The converse also holds true-i.e., an
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to negotiate individual cooperation or immunity
agreements."26 When corporations fear retaining employees
or advancing attorneys' fees on their behalf because
prosecutors are investigating their conduct or might consider
them "culpable," an employee's ability to obtain counsel is
diminished. When the government obtains incriminating
statements through corporate privilege waivers, an
employee's right to avoid self-incrimination may also be
rendered meaningless.
V. PROBLEMS INHERENT IN APPLYING
CURRENT ETHICAL STANDARDS TO
INVESTIGATIVE EMPLOYEE INTERVIEWS
While the Model Rules provide a comprehensive ethical
framework, many gaps exist in the provisions applicable to
corporate internal investigations. The changes motivated by
the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley and other recent events help
promote corporate accountability, but they do not address
the issues most critical to the conduct of internal
investigations. If anything, the recent amendments may
exacerbate tensions that counsel confront in the conduct of
employee interviews. A discussion of these difficulties
follows.
A. Identifying the Client
Problems may arise for lawyers who represent
corporations whenever a new legal challenge emerges that
raises questions about who should speak for the client. 27 As
noted earlier, the corporation-along with other entities such
organization is not automatically considered a target simply because its
officers or other employees are targets. Id.
326 Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations, supra note 22, pt.
IV.
327 In some instances the Model Rules do place limitations on who can
speak for an organizational client. See, e.g., MODEL RULEs OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.13(e) (2003) (organizational consent to dual representation
of entity and constituents may not be given by individual to be
represented).
COLUMBIA BUSINESS LA W REVIEW [Vol. 2003
INTERNAL CORPORATE INVESTIGATIONS
as partnerships, limited liability companies, and
associations-is an abstraction that acts only through real
people.328 As one commentator observes, "[t]he corporation is
poorly suited for the application of many legal principles
developed to order a society of flesh and blood individuals."329
Nevertheless, the Model Rules clearly provide that it is the
entity that the corporate lawyer represents ,33 and the first
task of any lawyer acting on behalf of a corporation or other
legal entity is to determine who speaks for the client with
respect to the matter at hand.331 This is a responsibility that
sometimes places corporate counsel in a difficult
predicament.
When the corporate client calls upon the lawyer to
conduct an internal investigation, the lawyer's task
encompasses not only the preliminary inquiry as to who
speaks for the client, but the critical next question: does this
32 See HAZARD AND HODES, supra note 222, § 2.3, at 2-17 n.1; Ralph
Jonas, Who Is the Client?: the Corporate Lawyer's Dilemma, 39 HASTINGS
L.J. 617 (1988). Jonas suggests that "the Bar should re-think some of the
fundamental assumptions underlying the principal that a corporate
lawyer owes his allegiance solely to the legal entity he represents.
Perhaps lawyers should not have abstractions as clients." Id. at 622.
329 McCall, supra note 261, at 625.
330 Ironically, however, while a principal justification for the entity
theory lies in the protection it affords stockholders, under the entity theory
the corporate lawyer has neither a direct relationship with stockholders
nor any duty running directly to them, except in a very few narrowly
circumscribed and unusual circumstances. As Jonas notes, "the
shareholders, who collectively are the owners of the mythical beast,
typically do not participate in the process by which the lawyer is selected,
retained, or fired.., the attorney who represents the corporation does not
consult nor owe any duty or allegiance of any kind whatsoever to the
shareholders." Jonas, supra note 328, at 617 (footnote omitted).
"' As Geoffrey Hazard observes, the entity concept embodied in Model
Rule 1.13(a) poses two important problems for a corporate lawyer: first,
she deals not with the actual client, but with corporate managers who
supposedly speak for the client-"client-people"-and second, she must
determine whether any given "client-person" has authority to speak for the
client in a particular matter. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Ethical Dilemmas of
Corporate Counsel, 46 EMoRY L.J. 1011 (1997). Professor Hazard further
observes as follows: "Put more colloquially, the problem for an attorney
dealing with a corporate official is: 'Who is this guy anyway?.' Id.
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person have a conflict of interest with respect to this matter?
Consequently,
in the corporate arena, the lawyer lives in an "Alice
in Wonderland" world. The client to whom he owes
undivided loyalty, fealty, and allegiance cannot
speak to him except through voices that may have
interests adverse to his client. He is hired and fired
by people who may or may not have interests
diametrically opposed to those of his client. And
finally, his client is itself an illusion-a fictional
"person" that exists or expires at the whim of its
shareholders, whom the lawyer does not
represent."
332
Understanding these difficulties helps, but it does not
resolve the underlying problem. In conducting an internal
investigation, counsel must serve the interests of the entity
itself-the corporation as a distinct legal person-even in
instances where this recognition creates a conflict with the
interests of the officer, director or employee who hired the
attorney to represent the company in the first place. As a
number of commentators have noted, and many practitioners
have experienced first-hand, determining exactly when a
conflict arises between a corporation and those who serve as
its senses and soul can be an extraordinarily difficult task.333
332 Jonas, supra note 328, at 619. In 1988, McCall pointed out that
corporate counsel will sometimes encounter situations in which the board
itself-the ultimate client under Model Rule 1.13-refuses to correct a
major problem or is itself engaged in activities that breach directors'
fiduciary duty. He proposed that one solution would be that rejected by
the ABA in a draft of Model Rule 1.13(c): "When faced with such a
situation, the corporation lawyer should have the option to take his or her
concerns beyond the board of directors to the shareholders or to the
appropriate authorities." McCall, supra note 261, at 639.
113 As George Reycraft observes, "[iun representing the organizational
client, the corporate lawyer must often grapple with conflicting duties of
loyalty, confidentiality, and zeal owed to the various 'constituents' or
interest groups that make up the organizational client .... Professional
responsibility guidelines fail 'to address the[sel problems of modem
corporate law practice."' Reycraft, supra note 19, at 608.
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It is simply not true that a corporate lawyer can
safely feel free of any fiduciary constraint when
dealing with, or against, an officer or other member
of the corporate client. First, loyalty to the
corporation and zealous representation of its
interests will require a corporate lawyer to maintain
the trust and confidence of all persons in the
corporation in order to assure access to important
facts and in order to maintain effective lines of
communication for the lawyer's advice .... Second,
legal duties owed to the corporation, such as the
lawyer's duties to protect client information . . .
almost automatically entail protecting the
communicative interests of individuals within the
organization . . . Third, the doctrine that a lawyer
owes no fiduciary obligation to a corporate officer is
no warrant for attacks on corporate employees.
Instead, the doctrine is a corollary to the
requirement that when the interests of the
corporation as a whole and any of its officers or
members materially diverge, corporate counsel is
required to pursue the interests of the whole and not
the divergent interests of any of its parts.334
In short, in the conduct of an internal investigation, a
lawyer must focus on representing the corporate client with
diligence. Counsel's goal is to determine whether
misconduct has occurred. If so, counsel's objectives are to
advise the client on how to remedy any damage caused by
the wrongdoing; how to avoid future problems; and how to
minimize the consequences of any legal violations in an
appropriate and lawful manner. While the optimal outcome
is almost always that which avoids adverse consequences for
both the company and its human constituents, if there is a
choice to be made, counsel is ethically bound to choose the
corporation. This concept now is also encompassed in federal
law applicable to attorneys who practice before the SEC
" Wolfram, supra note 222, at 735.
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under rules promulgated by the agency pursuant to
Sarbanes-Oxley 35
B. The Conduct of the Interview
Under the Model Rules, it is clear that counsel conducting
an internal investigation must embark upon their task with
one overriding objective-to minimize the consequences of
any wrongdoing for the corporation. However, while it is
apparent that the entity's interests must remain first and
foremost, the standards for dealing with employees and
other corporate constituents interviewed in the course of the
investigation are far less clear.
1. Applying the Clarification Standards of Model
Rules 1.13(f) and 4.3
As discussed in the preceding section,336 pursuant to
Model Rule 1.13(f) counsel must inform employees of the
client's identity only "when it is apparent that the
organization's interests are adverse to those of the
[employee] . 331 This is a fact-specific determination
dependent on counsel's analysis of potential adversity of
interest between the corporation and the employee.
Particularly for counsel who are strangers to the matter and
the people involved, it is likely to be very difficult to
determine in advance whether such adversity exists.
Adversity may become apparent only after the employee has
made an incriminating statement. Even if immediately
thereafter the investigating lawyer warns the employee that
the attorney-client privilege affords no individual protection
and explains that the employee may want to obtain personal
counsel, irreparable damage may already have been done.
This harm may include the loss of the Fifth Amendment's
protection against self-incrimination.
335 See supra text accompanying note 86.
336 See supra text accompanying notes 286-93.
331 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13 cmt. 11 (2003).
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The reality for the employee under the Model Rules
is that Rule 1.13 allows a corporate attorney to
withhold from the employee clarification that the
entity is her only client until after the employee has
confessed to a personally culpable act, despite the
fact that both Model Rules 4.3 and 4.4 encourage fair
treatment in an attorney's relationships with
nonclients.338
The standard of Model Rule 4.3-calling for disclosure
when there is potential for confusion as to the attorney's
role-regardless of adversity, may appear fairer, but even
here the attorney may have difficulty discerning whether
such confusion exists. All too often, corporate employees
may be anxious to appear knowledgeable, or erroneously
believe that they understand counsel's role. On the basis of
past experience they may believe that counsel will seek to
protect both the individual and the corporation. Another
hypothetical example may help illustrate this type of
circumstance. Take, for example, a physician affiliated with
a health care system who is accustomed to garden-variety
medical malpractice actions in which both the organization
and individual medical professionals associated with the
entity are named as defendants. In these situations, joint
representation of both the physician and the entity is
common. Physicians experienced with this dual
representation-either personally or through awareness of
lawsuits involving colleagues-may find it incredible that
the counsel they count on to protect their professional
reputations and livelihood have very different objectives
when conducting internal investigations.
In short, it may be overly optimistic to assume that
counsel engaged in interrogating corporate constituents can
either accurately predict that a particular interviewee's
interests are likely to diverge from her corporate client's or
readily determine that an interviewee is confused about the
lawyer's role in the matter. This is especially true when
there is a significant possibility that information gathered
338 Tate, supra note 216, at 25.
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during an internal investigation of suspected misconduct
may be turned over to the government.339
2. The Timing and Necessity of Pre-Interview
Statements
Regardless of whether a particular jurisdiction requires a
pre-interview statement, 4 ° many practitioners recommend
that counsel routinely provide such warnings to avoid any
possibility that a court will subsequently permit the
individual employee to invoke the protections of the
attorney-client privilege on grounds that an attorney-client
relationship existed between investigating counsel and the
interviewee. 4'
There are, of course, a number of downsides to requiring
pre-interview statements. The most significant is that any
kind of warning that distances counsel from a corporate
constituent is likely to chill the willingness of the employee
to talk with the investigating attorney.42  This is an
objection long since overcome with respect to Miranda
warnings in the law enforcement context. Nevertheless, the
issues are somewhat different when an employer is seeking
to determine whether its employees have engaged in
misconduct. Unless they enjoy a special relationship with
government-for example, by virtue of a contract to carry out
a function normally associated with governmental
authority343-employers are not state actors. They may
discipline or discharge an employee, but they do not have the
339 See supra text accompanying notes 201-08.
340 See supra text accompanying notes 308-09.
341 See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 108, at 100-01 ("For the client's sake 'it
is critical that there be no ambiguity about who represents whom during
the investigation"); see also, e.g., Bennett et al., supra note 48, at 179;
BLACK, supra note 26, § 4.03; VILLA, supra note 167, § 1.10; Wallace &
Waks, supra note 118, at 512. But see Tate, supra note 216, at 15-18
(suggesting that this concern provides little motivation to investigating
counsel).
342 See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 108, at 100; BLACK, supra note 26, §
4.03.
... See generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 270, § 6.4.3, at 492-95.
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power to curtail an individual's liberty or even to impose
monetary sanctions beyond withdrawal of compensation by
terminating employment.344 In a business setting, such
warnings may also create a furor over the role of counsel and
the intentions of the employer with respect to its employees.
Employees at all levels may be outraged that their employer
seems to be turning on them and distancing itself from them.
Counsel's ability to present the warnings effectively may
either exacerbate or ameliorate that reaction. In any event,
such an employee response is not an irrational one; the
employer will almost certainly attempt to distance itself from
any employee who has engaged in misconduct, even if the
misconduct occurred as a result of an employee's efforts to
benefit the employer.
Most experts agree that the strategic advantages of
providing some type of pre-interview warning outweigh the
disadvantages. 45 Nevertheless, if the rules of professional
responsibility do not require pre-interview warnings, some
lawyers will decide not to provide them or to offer only an
abbreviated form.
3. The Content of Pre-Interview Statements
The problematic aspects of employee interviews are not
limited to whether and when to provide a warning. The
content of counsel's statements is equally critical,
particularly with respect to the effects of the attorney-client
privilege and the employee's need for her own counsel. A
number of commentators have proposed various types of pre-
interview statements. For example, one article suggests that
in order to show the greatest care, all employees
interviewed formally or informally should be advised:
'" A few commentators have raised the question whether corporate
attorneys carrying out internal investigations required by statute could, in
some circumstances, be considered state actors. See, e.g., Coyne & Barker,
supra note 216, at 175; Turk, supra note 12, at 99-100.
... See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 108, at 100-01; Turk, supra note 12, at
97; Block & Barton, supra note 90, at 85.
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i. that the investigating attorneys represent the
company and not any employee;
ii. that the company's attorney-client privilege
applies to the interviews and the company retains
the right to decide whether or not to reveal to
regulators or others outside the company the
information obtained in any such interview; and
iii. that the company wishes that the employees
keep the interviews confidential and not, for
example, even talk among themselves about their
346interviews.
34
This model warning clearly identifies the role of the
attorney. It also indicates that it is the company's decision
whether it will ultimately reveal the information the
employee offers in the course of the interview, although not
all employees may realize that the phrase "regulators or
others" may include law enforcement agents and
prosecutors. The statement does not, however, address the
issue of counsel for individual employees.
Another authority offers a variation bracketing optional
clauses specifically addressed to issues such as retention of
personal counsel:
[I]t is important for you to know that we represent
the [Audit Committee] and not you personally. We
will be reporting to the [Audit Committee] on the
information you and others provide to us. Unlike a
lawyer representing you personally, we cannot
promise to maintain your confidences or to provide
you legal advice concerning your personal interests.
[If you believe you have interests that differ from the
Company's interests in this matter, you should
consult your own personal lawyer.]
346 Merrill, supra note 108, at 100. Merrill also points out that giving
such warnings does not preclude later representation of the employee by
the interviewing attorney. Id.
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The [Audit Committee] expects you to keep the facts
and substance of this interview confidential ....
The Company expects to take the position that this
interview and other interviews we are conducting are
protected by the attorney-client privilege and
constitute attorney work product. These privileges
should entitle the Company to withhold the
information received from the government or other
third parties. On the other hand, the Company may
ultimately determine that its interests will be best
served by disclosing some or all of the information we
receive. You need to understand that the decision
whether or not to disclose this information will be
made by the Company and that you will not be able
to prevent the Company from disclosing the
information you provide if it decides to do so.
3
11
This approach introduces the option of informing
employees of their right to have individual counsel present,
although an employee may not fully comprehend the
"differing interests" concept. The last paragraph of this
model statement, however, gives rise to another question: in
the current enforcement environment is it disingenuous to
indicate even that the company "expects" to invoke the
attorney-client and work-product privileges to protect the
information? As another article observes,
The investigating attorney will often ask questions of
a corporate employee which, if answered, might tend
to incriminate the employee. Because the questions
are being asked by an agent of the corporation and
not the government, the Fifth Amendment offers the
employee no protection against the adverse
consequences of making disclosures to his employer.
The attorney typically advises the employee that,
though the corporation may waive the privilege at
34 BLACK, supra note 26, form 13A. Another expert suggests that
investigating counsel should inform interviewees that they may wish to
obtain counsel at any time-before or during the interview-that counsel
perceives that there may be a reason to do so. See VILLA, supra note 167,
app. 1-1.
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some point in the future, it has no present intention
to do so. The attorney may tell the employee that the
investigation is being conducted to allow the
corporation to determine what happened and how
best to proceed. In the vast majority of cases, while
the employee may feel he must cooperate with his
employer's inquiry, the employee will take some
comfort in counsel's representation that the company
has not yet decided to disclose to the government
information learned from the employee.
Historically,... it was not a foregone conclusion that
the employee's statements would be delivered to the
government-indeed, such a disclosure would have
been unusual.
348
Today's reality is far different. Even if statements about
a corporation's present disclosure intentions are not actually
untruthful-and therefore impermissible under Model Rule
4.1-they are likely to be misleading. In the present
enforcement environment it is unwise for any corporate
constituent to find solace in the corporation's intent at the
time an internal investigation commences or is underway. It
is disingenuous for counsel to make any statements that
could lead an employee to draw such a conclusion.
A few commentators go well beyond the kind of pre-
interview statements set forth above and call for full-fledged
Miranda-type warnings. For example, a recent
141 Zornow and Krakaur, supra note 201, at 153 (emphasis added).
" In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the Supreme Court
ruled that the admissibility of statements given by persons in the course of
custodial interrogations would depend on police provision of four
warnings. As the Court explained in Dickerson:
These warnings (which have come to be known
colloquially as "Miranda rights") are: a suspect "has the
right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used
against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the
presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an
attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any
questioning if he so desires."




commentary on employee interviews sets forth a statement
composed by United States District Judge Frederick Lacey
as a desirable model."' Judge Lacey has suggested what he
terms an Adnarim351 warning for use at the outset of all
employee interviews conducted as part of internal corporate
investigations:
I am not your lawyer[;] I represent the corporation.
It is the corporation's interests I have been retained
to serve. You are entitled to have your own lawyer.
If you cannot afford a lawyer, the corporation may or
may not pay his fee. You may wish to consult with
him before you confer with me. Among other things,
you may wish to claim the privilege against self-
incrimination. You may wish not to talk to me at all.
What you tell me, if it relates to the performance of
your duties, and is confidential, will be privileged.
The privilege, however, requires explanation. It is
not your privilege to claim. It is the corporation's
privilege. Thus, not only can I tell, I must tell, others
in the corporation what you have told me, if it is
necessary to enable me to provide the legal services
to the corporation that has retained it has retained
me to provide.
Moreover, the corporation can waive its privilege and
thus, the president, or I, or someone else, can disclose
to the authorities what you tell me if the corporation
decides to waive its privilege.
Also, if I find wrongdoing, I am under certain
obligations to report it to the Board of Directors and
perhaps the stockholders.
Finally, the fact that our conversation is privileged
does not mean that what you did or said is protected
350 Block & Barton, supra note 90, at 40. See supra text accompanying
note 227.
351 "Adnarim" is "Miranda" spelled backwards. See supra note 349 and
accompanying text.
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from disclosure just because you tell me about it.
You may be subpoenaed, for example, and required to
tell what you did, or said or observed, even though
you told me about it.
Do you understand?352
Judge Lacey's Adnarim warning addresses two potential
sources of employee confusion about retaining personal
counsel by clearly stating that interviewees may wish to
obtain their own counsel and by addressing the possibility of
disclosure to law enforcement authorities openly and
directly. The Adnarim warning is rather lengthy, however,
and raises additional issues, such as subpoenas. These
points may be well outside the context of the pending
investigation. Helping an interviewee to understand them
may require extensive explanation that could distract both
employee and counsel from the principal focus of the
interview. Perhaps even more importantly, this kind of
warning may not only constrain the flow of information, but,
as another commentator points out, "advising employees that
they need not speak with company counsel may conflict with
the employees' duty to cooperate, implicit in the employee's
duty of loyalty."
353
Some commentators oppose such admonitions for very
practical reasons. The warnings could bring an internal
investigation to a grinding halt while employees scramble to
find individual counsel, even if they have no need to do so.
While fairness is important, if investigating counsel embrace
too many self-imposed procedural requirements, they may do
a real disservice to their client. If the bar does not better
define ethical rules for these situations, there will also be
substantial variations in practice that serve neither the
client and its employees nor the reputation of the legal
profession. This is a real tension that defies easy resolution.
Although various jurisdictions have begun to require more
352 Frederick B. Lacey, Remarks on Employee Interviews (reprinted in
Block & Barton, supra note 90, at 40).
13 Turk, supra note 12, at 99.
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than Model Rule 1.13(f) mandates,354  professional
responsibility codes and judicial decisions generally do not
require warnings as extensive as Judge Lacey proposes. 55
4. Responses to Employees' Questions
Beyond the questions of the necessity, timing and content
of warnings to employees interviewed in the course of
internal corporate investigations lies another ethical
conundrum: how should investigating counsel respond to
questions that employees themselves raise? Among the most
common inquiries are those focusing on the logistics of
obtaining individual representation, including finding and
paying for competent counsel. These questions are often
pivotal, particularly for lower echelon employees. 56 There
are at least three essential questions subsumed within the
overall issue: (1) Will the company pay for counsel; (2) Will
the company allow the employee time to obtain counsel; and
(3) Where can the employee turn for assistance in finding
counsel? Few commentators suggest how to resolve these
questions. 57 Several propose referral of these matters to the
client's General Counsel, but this begs the question.
Eventually, someone-whether it is the general counsel or
another corporate authority-will have to make the
necessary determination. Moreover, deflecting the question
may be a means of discouraging the pursuit of answers,
particularly for lower level employees who may be hesitant
to approach a senior corporate official.
Questions of entitlement to indemnification and fee
advancement often involve both legal analysis and policy
determinations. The legal analysis tracks the discussion set
" See supra text accompanying notes 308-09.
... See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 108, at 100-01; Turk, supra note 12, at
99.
36 See Tate, supra note 216, at 3-4.
... Even Judge Lacey's Adnarim warning, however, does not address
these issues, except to say that the company may or may not pay for an
individual employee's attorney.
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forth in Part III.C and D.358 There are a number of
possibilities: a corporate constituent may have a contractual
or statutory right to indemnification and advancement of
counsel fees, or the Board of Directors, General Counsel, or
other corporate authority may have discretion to make such
decisions on a case-by-case basis. The company's articles of
incorporation, bylaws, or internal regulations may address
the issue, or corporate directors' and officers' insurance
policies may provide coverage.
In short, it may or may not be possible readily to
determine whether the company will pay for an attorney, but
it is unfair to leave an employee in limbo on this issue.
Investigating counsel should have a clear idea of the answer
going into the interview phase of the investigation. At a
minimum, counsel should be prepared to provide an
employee with relevant factual information such as a copy of
the pertinent provisions of relevant corporate governance
documents, internal regulations, or a brief policy statement
from the company on this issue. If applicable, this material
should include the factual information that certain
employees may have contractual or statutory rights to fee
advancement or indemnification. Pursuant to Model Rule
4.4, the attorney should not provide legal advice to the
employee on her right to advancement of counsel fees, but, if
the corporation has determined not to advance legal fees,
counsel should inform the constituent that this decision may
involve legal questions as to which the interviewee may want
to obtain advice of counsel.
35 9
Another difficult inquiry that very often arises is the
simple, direct question: "Do I need my own lawyer?" The
standard wisdom is to reply that this is a decision that only
the employee can make. For example, one commentator
suggests: "The answer should typically include a statement
that the decision whether to retain counsel is up to the
employee and (if true, as is likely early in an investigation)
33 See supra text accompanying notes 235-47.
359 Id.
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that the interviewer may not have enough facts to make a
judgment. '360 Another offers the following advice:
The interviewer must repeat that he or she is
representing the company and cannot provide the
employee with any legal advice. The employee
should be instructed to direct all such questions to
the company's general counsel. These points should
be discussed until the employee has a clear
understanding of them. If the interview is
memorialized, the memorandum should state that
the interviewer repeated the warnings and the
employee understood them."36'
As noted earlier, however, referring questions to the
General Counsel does not solve the problem, if the General
Counsel has no ready answer.
3 62
More often than not, investigating counsel may not know
whether or not the employee to be interviewed needs counsel
at the beginning of the interview. Consequently, it makes
sense to tell the employee that this is a question for the
employee to decide. This may be the safest course. To go
even a bit further, however, and say that the interviewer
does not have the information necessary to make a judgment
may be disingenuous and offer false comfort. In some
instances-for example, when a lawyer conducting an
internal investigation interviews an employee who counsel
knows is likely to be terminated or named as culpable in the
course of voluntary disclosure to government authorities-
the lawyer is necessarily aware that it would be in the
employee's best interest to retain her own counsel. While it
would be improper under Model Rule 4.3 or any reasonable
ethical standard363 to advise the employee against obtaining
360 Merrill, supra note 108, at 100-01.
361 Turk, supra note 12, at 103. Other commentators also suggest
referring questions pertaining to representation, indemnification and
related issues to the corporation's general counsel. See, e.g., Lacey, supra
note 357.
362 See, e.g., supra text following note 357.
363 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §
103 (2000).
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personal counsel, it is permissible under current ethical
standards to respond that it may be in the employee's best
interests to obtain counsel." 4
If an employee decides to obtain her own counsel, the
investigating attorney needs to address the questions of how
long the employee has to do so and whether to suggest
names of attorneys an employee may want to consult. If the
client entity is not prepared to postpone the interview for
some period of time, the employee is forced to choose
between possible sanctions and her need to consult with
counsel. While crisis situations may demand a very short
time frame, it is hard to envision any situation in which
investigating counsel should decline to wait at least a short
time to permit an employee to obtain the advice of counsel.365
It is also permissible under the current Model Rules for
investigating counsel to offer the names of attorneys who
may be willing to represent the employee so long as the list
is not presented as her only option. 66 Of course, at the
conclusion of any such discussion, the question whether the
corporation will pay for separate representation is likely to
arise.
There is at least one creative resolution to many
questions pertaining to employee counsel rights that many
corporations have employed in these kinds of situations.
This involves corporate retention of counsel who does not
represent the corporation solely for the purpose of
responding to questions raised by employees about to be
interviewed in the course of an internal investigation. 7
While this kind of solution adds cost, it has many benefits.
In particular, it provides a mechanism to move the
364 The Model Rules prohibit false statements of material fact or law.
See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.1 cmt. 1 (2003); HAZARD &
HODES, supra note 222, § 37.3, at 37-5.
365 See, e.g., COYNE & BARKER, supra note 215, at 192.
366 See supra text accompanying notes 235-47.
311 See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 108, at 102-03.
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investigation forward while still affording employees an
opportunity to consult with counsel. 68
Counsel also must anticipate that an employee may ask
to have another employee present during the interview, or
she may request the attendance of a union representative if
she is a union member. The National Labor Relations Board
("NLRB") has determined that both union members and non-
union employees have the right to request the presence of a
union representative or co-worker pursuant to the National
Labor Relations Act.369 The United States Supreme Court
affirmed the NLRB's decision with respect to union
employees in NLRB v. Weingarten, holding that an
employer's denial of an employee's request to have a union
representative present at an investigatory interview, which
the employee reasonably believed might result in
disciplinary action, was an unfair labor practice.370 The
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
upheld the Board's decision with respect to nonunion
employees in Epilepsy Foundation of Northeast Ohio v.
NLRB. 71
Another question an employee may ask is what
consequences, if any, will result from declining to participate
in the interview. The Model Rules permit counsel to provide
a simple factual statement as to company policy, so long as
368 In this context, it is worth noting that Model Rule 1.13 permits
counsel to represent both the company and individual constituents, unless
an unwaivable conflict exists. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
1.13(g), R. 1.7 (2003). In the current enforcement environment, this
approach is rarely wise. Undertaking internal investigations in this
fashion invites irreconcilable conflicts. See COYNE & BARKER, supra note
215, at 179 (cautioning against joint representation of company and
employee).
369 National Labor Relations Act §§ 7, 8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C §§ 157,
158(a)(1) (2000).
370 420 U.S. 251, 260-61 (1975).
371 268 F.3d 1095, 1100 (D.C. Cir. 2001). See generally Richard
Neumeg, Annotation, When Is Supervisory Interview by Employer
"Investigatory-Disciplinary" so as to Entitle Employee to Union
Representation Under § 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (§ 29
U.S.C.A. 157), 48 A.L.R. FED. 360 (1980).
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no legal advice is impermissibly supplied. For example, if
true, counsel may tell the employee that the company may
decide to impose disciplinary sanctions or even terminate the
employment of those who decline to cooperate in the internal
investigation.
37 2
C. Ethical Issues Pertaining to Prosecutors' Corporate
Cooperation Policies
Prosecutorial guidelines advising or permitting
prosecutors to request organizations to waive the protections
of their attorney-client and work-product privileges, to
determine whether a company has acceptably sanctioned
allegedly culpable but unconvicted employees, and to count a
corporation's advancement of fees or promises to support
targeted employees as strikes against the organization for
purposes of charging, plea negotiations and sentencing
proceedings raise another set of ethical concerns. One major
problem is that these kinds of policies invite investigating
counsel to bow to the pressure to become participants in a
sotto voce effort to obtain incriminating information from
corporate constituents without basic procedural protections.
As recognized by the DOJ's own business prosecution
policy,373 this approach frees the government to obtain
information from individuals without any of the procedural
protections our criminal justice system ordinarily affords to
those accused of crimes ranging from possession of illegal
drugs to murder.
It is hard to square this policy with either Model Rule
4.4's mandate that "[in representing a client, a lawyer shall
not use .. .means of obtaining evidence that violate the
rights of third parties,"374 or the admonition of the
accompanying comment: "Responsibility to a client requires
a lawyer to subordinate the interests of others to those of the
client, but that responsibility does not imply that a lawyer
372 See BLACK, supra note 26, § 4.03, at 4-7.
... Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations, supra note 22, pt.
VI, cmt.
374 Id.
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may disregard the rights of third persons. 375  For
prosecutors, these kinds of policies should also raise
questions under Model Rule 3.8: 376 do they undermine the
right to counsel? Do they result in the waiver of important
constitutional rights such as the Fifth Amendment
protection against self-incrimination by unrepresented
persons?
Prosecutors' requests for waiver of corporate attorney-
client and work-product protections are troublesome because
they essentially enlist private companies and their counsel in
doing the work of law enforcement agencies without making
this connection clear to those interviewed in the course of
internal investigations. Counterbalancing these concerns is
the reality that law enforcement resources are inadequate to
deal with all of the problems that may arise in business
corporations, particularly major companies with enormous
economic resources of their own and complex organizational
structures. There are alternatives to blanket waiver
requests however. These include requiring corporations to
divulge the findings of internal investigations without
turning over privileged materials, and partial waiver of the
work-product privilege as to factual materials but not as to
counsel's mental impressions, opinions or conclusions."'
Prosecutors ordinarily should not have a compelling need to
obtain attorney-client advice, unless the corporation raises
an advice-of-counsel defense.
Other aspects of the DOJ's current corporate cooperation
policies are also troublesome, particularly those pertaining to
advancement of counsel fees. It is difficult to conceive of
legitimate reasons for federal prosecutors to concern
... MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.4 cmt. 1 (2003).
376 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(c) (2003); supra text
accompanying notes 312-26.
377 Cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3) (permitting federal courts to order
disclosure of work product, but requiring courts to "protect against
disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal
theories of an attorney or other representative of a party concerning the
litigation"). See also Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393-94
(1981); discussion supra text accompanying notes 161-66.
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themselves with who pays for a corporate constituent's
attorney's fees. State law governs the existence, operation
and governance of business corporations, and state
corporations codes set both requirements for and limitations
on fee advancement.3 8  The only apparent reason for
prosecutors to consider fee advancement as a factor in
charging, plea negotiation or sentencing position decisions is
to make it more difficult for individuals to obtain counsel, or
at least to obtain counsel with the resources necessary to
function effectively in complex corporate criminal matters.
Similarly, corporations should not be penalized for failing to
sanction individual constituents on the basis of unproven
allegations. If a corporation improperly advances fees to
officers, directors or employees who have wronged the
company, or if it fails to mete out sanctions against errant
managers or employees, it is the company's board of directors
or its shareholders who need to address the problem. 79 If
the directors fail to act, shareholder derivative actions are an
appropriate means of addressing this problem.38 °
In sum, Model Rule 3.8 should clarify prosecutors'
responsibilities with respect to corporate cooperation
demands. It does not do so in its present form. 81
311 See supra text accompanying notes 235-47.
379 See PALMITER, supra note 235, § 18.1.
380 Id.; Block & Barton, supra note 90, at 84; Reddy, supra note 90.
381 Of course, there are alternative manners of dealing with the
problem of ensuring fairness to those interviewed in the course of internal
investigations. For example, Congress could address the problem by
legislatively modifying related DOJ corporate cooperation policies as it did
in the 1999 McDade Amendment, Pub. L. No. 105-119, 111 Stat. 2440
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (2000)). The McDade Amendment overruled
a DOJ policy directive issued by then-Attorney General Richard
Thornburgh. The directive instructed prosecutors that they could
communicate directly with "any person who has been made the subject of
formal federal adversarial proceedings arising from that investigation,
regardless of whether the person is known to be represented by counsel"
contrary to MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (2003), see supra text
accompanying notes 308-10, and in direct violation of many state ethics
rules. See Zornow & Krakaur, supra note 201, at 159-60. Or the courts
could impose a requirement for Miranda-style warnings as a condition of
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D. The Repercussions for the Legal Profession of
Current Ethical Ambiguities Concerning the
Conduct of Employee Interviews
Public confidence in the legal profession has been at a low
ebb for the past several years. Within the profession, more
lawyers than ever before have reported disillusionment and
even burnout. "'Professionalism' is now the accepted allusion
to the Bar's ambitious struggle to reverse a troubling decline
in the esteem in which lawyers are held-not only by the
public, but also, ironically, by lawyers themselves."38 2 Now,
"probably more than any other profession, lawyers are the
target of some of the most cutting, wide sweeping, and
relentless criticism .... Many lawyers themselves are not
free from ambivalence and confusion about their own
roles."383 Public perception that lawyers contributed to the
problems that led to the collapse of Enron and other major
corporate debacles is an important reason. There are many
other concerns, however, including what the Supreme Court
referred to in Upjohn as "sharp practices."3 84  Internal
investigations present myriad opportunities for sharp, or at
least inconsistent, practices on the part of both defense
counsel and prosecutors. It is tempting for all concerned to
focus on information-gathering responsibilities at the
admissibility for evidence obtained against an individual in the course of
an internal investigation. These kinds of remedies, however, are neither
likely to be implemented, nor particularly desirable. Internal
investigations are the creation of lawyers, and they are conducted by or at
the direction of lawyers. Consequently, as the number of internal
investigations continues to multiply exponentially and the number of
lawyers involved in this work skyrockets, it is incumbent upon the legal
profession itself-defense counsel and prosecutors, litigators and corporate
advisors alike-to revisit its own standards for how lawyers deal with
corporate constituents in the context of internal investigations.
382 Timothy P. Terrell & James H. Wildman, Rethinking
Professionalism, 41 EMORY L.J. 403, 403 (1992).
383 WOLFRAM, supra note 222, § 1.1.
' Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 398 (1981) (quoting
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947)).
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expense of fairness. This has a price for lawyers as well as
for corporate constituents.
There is little doubt that most lawyers conducting
internal investigations on behalf of corporate clients are well
aware that an employee interview may have serious
consequences for the individual interviewed. Even so,
however, a sense of obligation to the client may prompt those
who are most skilled at the task to use their interpersonal
skills to persuade those interviewed to talk candidly with
them. No matter how carefully crafted the rules, this reality
is unlikely to change. Ironically, the longer counsel and an
interviewee have known each other, the more the lawyer
may have demonstrated both integrity and trustworthiness.
The more frequently the lawyer has assisted the company
with sound advice and offered legal and moral support at
difficult times, the more likely the interviewee is to talk
candidly, almost no matter what counsel says.
Again, a hypothetical example may prove useful. If a
Finance Department employee in a large company has
worked for many years with an in-house attorney on
financial statement disclosures and other matters, a
relationship of mutual trust and understanding is likely to
exist between them. If the attorney subsequently interviews
the financial employee in the context of an internal
investigation, it may be almost impossible for the employee
to view the attorney as a potential adversary. The same
situation could well be true with respect to an outside
attorney with whom the employee has worked on previous
occasions. Moreover, as any skilled lawyer, investigator or
counselor intuitively understands, persuading people to talk
involves far more than words, more even than prior
relationships. For good or ill, it is often a matter of the
interviewer's demeanor, the quality of a handshake, the offer
of a hot cup of coffee on a cold day, a brusque, authoritative
manner toward some and a breezy introduction that
implicitly minimizes the significance of the interview and its
potential consequences for others.
Consequently, lawyers need to revisit the ground rules
that apply to the conduct of internal interviews. This is
[Vol. 2003
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particularly important at a time when the profession is
caught up in responding to corporate scandals and focused
more on ensuring that offenders are brought to justice than
on safeguarding the integrity of the process that delivers
these results. "[Tihe social usefulness of the law, and in turn
the esteem in which lawyers are held, depends ultimately on
the respect the law receives from non-lawyers."385 All over
the country the officers, directors and employees of
corporations and other entities are involved in internal
investigations. Lawyers need to make sure that their
conduct in these matters inspires confidence and trust, not
suspicion and distrust. Lawyers also need to be confident
enough of the integrity of what they do to respect
themselves.
VI. PROPOSED PRINCIPLES FOR THE CONDUCT
OF EMPLOYEE INTERVIEWS AND
PROSECUTORIAL CRITERIA FOR ASSESSING
CORPORATE COOPERATION
There are no easy solutions to the ethical dilemmas
encountered in conducting internal investigative interviews
or in addressing corporate cooperation. These situations
bring into sharp focus a number of competing tensions. An
employer's need to ferret out misconduct and expose and
address it before it becomes pernicious enough to badly
damage or even destroy the entity as a whole must be
counterbalanced against an employee's justifiable
expectation of fairness from both his employer and his
government. The concepts of procedural fairness ingrained
into contemporary culture compete with the government's
understandable desire to obtain information about corporate
conduct, especially when hard decisions need to be made
about filing charges and negotiating pleas. But employees
must also be able to trust their employers, or morale and
productivity will suffer. 86 Concerns over the impact of
" Terrell & Wildman, supra note 382, at 426.
... See supra text accompanying notes 230-33.
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employee disaffection must contend against the fiduciary
obligations of business managers and the ethical duties of
corporate counsel to seek the welfare of the whole over the
interests of any individual constituent. Perhaps most
importantly, counsel need clear guidelines to decide how to
conduct internal investigations and what to advise corporate
clients dealing with the outcomes of these inquiries.
Prosecuting attorneys must also ask themselves whether
corporate cooperation demands go too far in compromising
the basic procedural protections that they are obligated to
uphold as ministers of justice.
The incorporation of a few basic principles into the Model
Rules and state laws based on these standards could go a
long way toward resolving some of these tensions by
providing clearer guidance to both corporate counsel and
prosecutors caught up in these ethical dilemmas. 81
Following are suggested guidelines designed to serve as a
starting point.
A. Proposals for New Ethical Ground Rules for
Investigative Employee Interviews
38'
* Before beginning to interview a corporate
constituent, investigating counsel should state the
general nature of the investigation, identify the
lawyer's client, and explain that the lawyer's role in
the investigation is to protect the interests of the
organization itself rather than those of any
individual.
387 These proposals are intended to that synthesize and build on much
of what scholars, practitioners and commentators have learned as internal
investigations have become increasingly common during the last several
years. Consequently, they are offered as a starting place for discussion
rather than as proposals for specific changes in particular rules.
... These guidelines assume that the interviewee does not have
personal counsel. If investigating counsel knows that a corporate
constituent has his own attorney, Model Rule 4.2 requires investigating
counsel to obtain permission from the constituent's attorney before
speaking with him. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (2003);
supra text accompanying notes 301-02.
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This principle goes beyond the current apparent adversity
standard of Model Rule 1.13(f),389 as well as the potential
confusion principle of Model Rule 4.3390 Opening an
interview with a brief statement of the nature of the
investigation allows the interviewee to have a sense of the
objectives of the inquiry. It may serve to dispel groundless
fears an employee may have of the process, and, at a
minimum, it permits the employee to have basic information
about the inquiry so that he can make appropriate decisions
with respect to participation and the need for his own
counsel.
Counsel should also begin every internal investigative
interview with a clear explanation of the identity of the
client, her role in the matter, and where counsel's loyalties
and duty lie. Corporate constituents at any level may be
unaware that interviewing counsel represents the entity and
that counsel owes a duty of loyalty to the entity that requires
her to safeguard the interests of the whole over those of any
of its constituents. Even knowledgeable senior managers
may erroneously, perhaps even unconsciously, believe that
personal relationships with counsel trump basic ethical
obligations to the entity. Consequently, counsel should not
conduct any interview without providing such a statement.
9 Investigating counsel may request the
interviewee to maintain the confidentiality of the
interview. In any event, counsel should state that the
corporation may find it necessary or advisable to
disclose both the results of the investigation and any
information gathered during its course to law
enforcement authorities or other parties. Counsel
should explain that this decision rests with the
corporation, and that the interviewee cannot prevent
any such disclosure.
Counsel should not volunteer that the corporation has no
present intention to disclose either the results of the internal
investigation or the information gathered in the course of its
'8 See supra text accompanying notes 286-93.
31 See supra text accompanying notes 304-09.
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prosecution. At best, this may provide false comfort; at
worst, such a statement may mislead the interviewee, in
violation of Model Rule 4.1,391 into concluding that there is
no need to retain individual counsel, at least until a decision
to disclose is made. By then, significant damage to the
interviewee's interests may already have been done.
Moreover, without such a clarification, even relatively
sophisticated employees may assume that they are entitled
to Miranda warnings before what they say can be used as a
basis for criminal prosecution.
392
; At the beginning of an internal investigation,
and at various points during its course, investigating
counsel should make a good faith assessment whether
the matter under investigation poses the risk of
criminal liability for the organization and/or any of its
constituents. If so, counsel should inform the
interviewee of the option of retaining personal
counsel having counsel present during the interview.
Counsel may not advise a corporate constituent
against obtaining personal counsel or provide any
other legal advice to a corporate constituent during
the course of the investigation on any matter related
to the inquiry.93 Investigating counsel may advise an
organizational constituent that it is in the
constituent's best interest to obtain individual
counsel.
Investigating counsel should be prepared to answer the
question: "Do I need my own lawyer?" by advising the
constituent that it is in his best interest to obtain individual
representation if counsel has enough information to make a
judgment and reasonably believes that this is so. Otherwise,
counsel should inform the constituent either that counsel
does not have enough information to make such a judgment,
or that only the employee can make this decision.
31 See supra text accompanying notes 296-300.
392 See supra text accompanying notes 224-227 and note 349.
311 See supra text accompanying notes 305-06 and 363.
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In any situation involving a potential conflict of interest
between a client organization and its constituents, counsel
should consider advising the organization that it may retain
an attorney on behalf of its constituents to advise them in
determining whether they need their own counsel, resolving
questions pertaining to fee advancement, and addressing
related issues.394
* Counsel should be prepared to respond to
questions concerning the corporation's fee
advancement and indemnification policies.
Counsel should not provide legal advice to corporate
constituents on these issues,395 but counsel should be
prepared to supply factual information as to the
corporation's position with respect to this issue and, if
applicable, how a corporate constituent may apply for fee
advancement, review relevant corporate policies, or contact
the corporate authority making this determination. Where
this determination may involve legal analysis of statutes,
contractual rights, or corporate policies, investigating
counsel may advise constituents that it may be in their best
interests to seek the advice of personal counsel on this
threshold question.396
• Upon request, investigating counsel should be
prepared to suspend the interview long enough to
permit the interviewee to obtain counsel or to
consider whether to do so.
The period of time should be reasonable under the
circumstances; it may be as short as several hours in a crisis
situation, although a considerably longer period is desirable.
Investigating counsel may provide an organizational
constituent with the names of attorneys who may be
available to provide personal representation. Counsel should
clearly communicate that the constituent is not required to
... See supra text accompanying notes 251 and 368.
... See supra text accompanying note 305.
396 Id.
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choose one of the attorneys suggested by investigating
counsel. 97
9 Investigating counsel may make a factual
statement informing constituents of the client
organization's position with respect to refusal to
participate in the investigation.
Counsel may convey the client entity's policy or refer
interviewees to appropriate authority within the
organization for further discussion of possible consequences
of failure to cooperate with investigating counsel. If the
referral option is followed, the client official should be
prepared to respond to employee questions. 98
B. Principles Pertaining to Prosecutorial Decisions and
Corporate Cooperation Policies
* Prosecutors and other government counsel
should request privilege waivers with respect to
internal investigations only when no other approach
will serve the interests of justice.
Before requesting corporations to waive the protections of
the attorney-client or work-product privileges, prosecuting
attorneys should attempt to work with defense counsel to
avoid the need for privilege waivers by agreeing on
alternative ways to obtain relevant factual information.
If a prosecuting attorney believes in good faith that
privilege waivers are necessary to secure justice in a given
situation, the prosecutor should first attempt to satisfy this
need on the basis of fact-based work-product, avoiding, if
possible, the need for relinquishment of the mental
impressions, opinions or conclusions of counsel. 9
Prosecuting attorneys should rarely request waiver of the
attorney-client privilege. Such waiver requests are
appropriate only where there is no other way to serve the
interests of justice.
... See supra text accompanying notes 365-66.
... See supra text accompanying notes 356-62.
... See supra text accompanying note 377.
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* Prosecutors and other government counsel
should not demand that organizations demonstrate
cooperation by sanctioning constituents on the basis
of unproven allegations.
While prosecutors may consider an organization's
consistent failure to mete out sanctions or to terminate its
relationship with officers, directors or employees who have
violated the organization's business ethics policies or
engaged in illegal conduct, prosecutors should not impose
adverse consequences on an organization with respect to
charging, plea negotiation or sentencing position decisions
merely because the organization declines to sanction a
constituent on the basis of unproven allegations."'
* Prosecutors and other government counsel
should not encourage organizations to deny
constituents fee advancement and other support as
indicia of corporate cooperation.
Prosecuting attorneys should not attempt to influence the
ability of corporate constituents to retain counsel. An
organization's advancement of legal fees to individuals under
investigation or charged with crimes related to their
responsibilities as officers, directors or employees of the
entity should not be considered as an adverse factor against
the organization in charging decisions, plea negotiations, or
in determining the government's position with respect to
criminal sentencing proceedings.4 1
VII. CONCLUSION
Internal corporate investigations are likely to remain an
important part of corporate legal practice for many years to
come. Eventually, compliance programs may obviate the
need for separate investigations, but this will not become a
realistic possibility for many years, if ever. Recent corporate
scandals and concomitant criticism of lawyers' conduct in
connection with these events have focused national attention
" See supra text accompanying notes 377-80.
401 Id.
No. 3:859]
COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW
on designing and implementing mechanisms to hold both
business managers and corporate attorneys accountable.
Congress, law enforcement agencies and the public are
calling upon lawyers to play a major role in promoting
corporate legal compliance and in curbing the excesses that
led to the collapse of several major American companies.
Lawyers must respond to these demands for corporate
accountability, but the legal profession also needs to focus on
ensuring basic fairness to individuals who act on behalf of
corporate entities. In the rush to reform corporate
governance and prosecute corporate misconduct, it is all too
easy to forget the need to treat individuals fairly. Zeal for
ferreting out corporate wrongdoing should not require
corporate constituents to sacrifice basic protections
ordinarily afforded persons involved in investigations of
wrongdoing. It is incumbent upon the members of the legal
profession to take steps to ensure that appropriate
protections are in place, particularly when lawyers who
represent organizations investigate allegations of
wrongdoing by their corporate constituents. These measures
are necessary to protect individual officers, directors and
employees and to safeguard the integrity of the legal
profession itself.
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